2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Report submitted by Morocco

Context of the ninth NPT Review Conference

1. The ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, scheduled for 27 April to 22 May in New York, is taking place in an international security context marked chiefly by:

- Deteriorating international security and exacerbation of the threat of terrorism, especially in the Middle East and in the Sahel-Saharan region.
- Continued inertia of the machinery of disarmament: the Conference on Disarmament is still unable to adopt a programme of work. The Disarmament Commission has wound up a third cycle with no agreement on recommendations regarding nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures in the sphere of conventional weapons.
- Continuation of the process of international conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, with a widening of support for the idea of an instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons.
- Lack of tangible progress in implementing the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, especially with respect to disarmament, and the continuing deferral of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons.

2. However, the following salient developments should be noted:

- Continuing implementation of the bilateral START II (strategic arms reduction treaty) agreement by the United States and Russia.
- The signing by nuclear weapon States of the Protocol to the Semipalatinsk treaty establishing a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

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- The continuation of efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), especially through its technical cooperation programme, to advance the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for purposes of development, in conformity with the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the provisions of the NPT.

- The IAEA non-proliferation regime, whose principal component remains the NPT safeguards agreements, continues to prove effective despite difficulties and challenges.

- The agreement between the P5+1 and Iran represents a major positive development in efforts aimed at resolving the question of the Iranian nuclear programme.

- The Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) process has focused attention on the importance of ensuring the security of radioactive and nuclear materials and facilities. The Washington summit identified and defined the threat of nuclear terrorism, and the Seoul summit explored other priorities in regard to nuclear safety and security, notably security of radioactive sources and security of information regarding nuclear activities. The third summit at The Hague kept up the political momentum and strengthened international awareness of the imperative of nuclear security and safety.

3. The success of the ninth NPT Review Conference will necessarily depend on the political will of States to find common ground with a view to adopting a consensual final document.

4. The success of the next conference will require great flexibility and political will to find common ground for the adoption of a final document encompassing concrete actions that respect the subtle balance between the three pillars of the Treaty.

5. However, it needs to be stressed that simply reiterating previously agreed measure would not constitute a success. The NPT is at a crossroads and innovative, bold measures are called for in order to preserve the credibility of the Treaty and the integrity of the regimes it has established. Proposals are offered by way of a conclusion in this report.

6. The Kingdom of Morocco reiterates that the NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a key instrument to preserve world peace and security.

Strengthening the national legal and regulatory arsenal

7. The Kingdom of Morocco has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in the framework of the NPT since 1973 and ratified the Additional Protocol to that agreement on 5 March 2011.

8. The Kingdom of Morocco has been a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material since 22 September 2002. The 2005 amendment of that convention is in the final stages of ratification following its approval consecutively by the Council of Ministers and Parliament.

9. Morocco adopted legislation on civil liability in case of nuclear damage on 20 January 2005 and an implementing decree was adopted in 2006, at the same time as a decree conferring the backing of the State on the National Centre for Nuclear Energy, Science and Technologies, which operates the research reactor.

10. On 18 September 2014 the Kingdom of Morocco promulgated Act 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety and security and on the establishment of the agency entrusted with its oversight. The aim is to harmonize the national legal arsenal with the relevant provisions of the international conventions on the subject.

11. Act 142-12 provides for the establishment of a National Regulatory Authority whose mandate is to provide close monitoring of nuclear materials and radioactive sources; to maintain an inventory of them and to apply safety and security measures. The implementing decree which establishes this Agency is in the process of being finalized and is expected to be adopted in 2015.

12. The Kingdom of Morocco has been strengthening its legal arsenal in this area through the promulgation on 20 January 2015 of a decree on safety and management of hazardous wastes, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

13. Morocco participates in the IAEA data base on illicit trafficking and is currently at work on establishing an export control regime for dual-use products, in cooperation with the United States of America and the European Union.

14. In keeping with its unwavering commitment, the Kingdom of Morocco remains convinced that the campaign against illicit trafficking in equipment and materials is capable of preventing non-state actors from gaining access to or producing weapons of mass destruction.

Morocco's contribution to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime

15. Morocco also participates in efforts to secure the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements. That universality is essential in order to ensure the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime.

16. Morocco, which supports the IAEA safeguards regime, continues to contribute to all efforts to achieve that aim, and emphasizes that the IAEA should have all necessary means to effectively discharge its mandate with respect to safeguards.

17. Morocco contributes to advancing the implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and participates in exchanges of experience with respect to its implementation.

18. On 15 February 2000 Morocco ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature on 24 September 1996, and avails itself of every opportunity to renew appeals for accession to that treaty by all States that have not yet done so.

19. Morocco welcomes the observance of moratoria on nuclear tests, while recalling that they cannot be considered as an alternative to ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. Morocco welcomes the launching of a process of conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and will continue to participate in them, in the conviction that the process can contribute real added value to efforts under way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

20. Morocco favours strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime and has contributed to all efforts with that aim in view. Morocco has always stressed the need to make available to the Agency all necessary means to enable it to effectively fulfil its safeguards mandate.

21. Morocco co-chaired with France on 24 and 25 September 2009 the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT, and has developed an action plan (2009-2011) with a view to the ratification and entry into force of the treaty, in conformity with the final Declaration adopted by consensus at that Conference.

22. Morocco is aware of the complex character of the threat of terrorism and fully shares the international community's concern regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, it has regularly brought up to date its national report in keeping with paragraph 4 of Resolution 1540 (2004) of the Security Council.

23. Morocco, which presided over the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, has joined in the emerging consensus for the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This is a significant step in the global fight against international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Morocco signed this Convention on 19 April 2006 and has been a party to it since 23 February 2010.

24. The Kingdom of Morocco also contributes to efforts being pursued in the context of voluntary non-proliferation initiatives. Thus, Morocco has since 2011 chaired the Response and Mitigation Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). To that end, it organized the first meeting of that Initiative on 30 and 31 October 2006, as well as meetings of the Implementation and Assessment Group in 2012 and 2015. Morocco has also been a partner in the Proliferation Security Initiative since 18 May 2008.

25. Morocco has organized several activities, including an international exercise on "Response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials" and "ConvEx-3" exercises, combining aspects of nuclear safety and security, in collaboration with international partners, including the IAEA.

26. Morocco has, since 2011, hosted a Centre of Excellence on Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical (NRBC) hazards in Rabat for African countries of the Atlantic seaboard in cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union; the aim is to strengthen the response and mitigation capacities of countries of the region when faced with NRBC hazards.

Implementation of NPT Review Conference recommendations

27. The Kingdom of Morocco confirms its steadfast commitment to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its deep respect for the treaty's underlying principles and objectives, as well as its commitment to strict application of all its provisions.

28. The Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that the NPT constitutes the point of reference of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and considers it a key instrument for the preservation of world peace and security.

29. Recent developments in the field of international security have clearly shown the vital importance of the NPT and the need to consolidate and preserve its credibility, in order to ensure the success of efforts being exerted against threats of nuclear terrorism and their networks, and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

30. The Kingdom of Morocco considers it imperative that the provisions of the NPT and the obligations deriving from them be respected by all State parties. Likewise, the measures put forward by decisions of review conferences constitute contracts for which full respect will enable us collectively to advance towards the realization of the objectives of the NPT.

31. The Kingdom of Morocco, as a State party to the NPT, has regularly adhered to decisions concerning the strengthening of the NPT review process and has always taken part in the initiatives aimed at strengthening the authority of the regime and promoting its universality.

32. The Kingdom of Morocco has also supported all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly aimed at promoting disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security.

33. The Kingdom of Morocco continues to exert efforts to resolve blockages in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. To that end, it intends, during its presidency of the Conference in March-April 2015, to:

- Support the opening of negotiations on the development of a fissile materials cut-off treaty;
- Work for the start of negotiations on a legal instrument on negative security assurances;
- Support the launching of negotiations for the adoption of an international convention on nuclear disarmament.

34. The Kingdom of Morocco reiterates its commitment to the inalienable right of NPT States parties to develop research, production and use of energy and technologies for peaceful purposes, in keeping with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the framework of international cooperation and under IAEA supervision.

35. Morocco underscores that this right should be exercised in full observance of the obligations of security and safety assurances, as stipulated in international conventions and standards on the subject.

36. Morocco remains convinced of the effectiveness of the approach set out in article VII of the NPT aimed at creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, as a useful means to strengthen the regime of nuclear non-proliferation in order to secure the realization of nuclear disarmament and the consolidation of peace and security regionally and internationally.

37. Morocco regrets that the international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction did not take place pursuant to the 2010 action plan for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. That conference could have been an historic opportunity to trigger a process enabling the region to be rid of weapons of mass destruction and to strengthen regional peace and security.

38. In that regard, Morocco reiterates its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as a confidence-building measure in the region and a contribution to strengthening peace and security regionally and internationally.

39. Morocco remains convinced that consolidating the multilateral approach and international cooperation represent key elements in achieving universal and effective responses to new global threats.

40. ***Proposals for the Review*** Conference On the occasion of this review conference, Morocco calls upon member States to explore ways of making progress on the following:

1. **Improving the preparatory process**. Experience has shown that delaying negotiation until the final days of the third meeting of the preparatory committee is not productive. Thought should be given, for example, to devoting the entire third meeting, except the first days reserved for general debate, to a true negotiation on a draft final document of the Review Conference.

2. **Visibility**. Even if review conferences have not yielded agreed measures or an action plan for a precise timetable, it would be unfortunate to take the view that the application of such measures can be deferred indefinitely. It has become necessary to draw up a timetable comprising realistic time limits at least for the measures that are already agreed.

3. **Verification**. The disarmament domain is the only pillar of the Treaty wholly lacking in verification mechanisms. Although setting up a complete verification regime seems out of reach in the present context, measures should nevertheless be agreed upon that would enable the review process and the States parties to verify **the implementation of agreed measures in the context of the review. Such a mechanism would constitute an important confidence-building mechanism for non-nuclear weapon States.**

4. **Responsibility** and accountability. The Review Conference and the meetings of its preparatory committee should serve as a forum for review and follow-up. For example, reports submitted by nuclear-weapon States on implementation of decisions regarding disarmament could be the subject of a review that could give rise to recommendations.

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Report on the implementation of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Submitted by Romania

1. The present report sets out a general overview of steps and measures undertaken by Romania in the implementation of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. During the previous Treaty review cycle, Romania submitted, in 2008, on the occasion of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, a report with a general overview of steps and measures undertaken by Romania in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

3. Romania reaffirms all the elements of the position of principle contained therein. Accordingly, the present report is focused on the measures undertaken by Romania since the conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference.

4. Throughout the reporting period, Romania continued to fully support the efforts envisaged by the international community towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, to act in line with its non-proliferation policy and commitments and to strongly support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. From this perspective, Romania has undertaken the following main measures and participated in the following activities:

(a) Romania has taken every opportunity, at the bilateral and multilateral levels, to emphasize the importance of the observance of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments undertaken by all States Parties to the Treaty;

(b) Romania was actively engaged in the international effort to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reinforce its implementation and promote its universality during the current Treaty review cycle, including by chairing, on behalf of the Eastern European Group, the second session of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva, in 2013, and Main Committee II during the current Review Conference;

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(c) Romania considers that the main priorities to be pursued in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament remain the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,[1] the negotiation of the fissile material cut-off treaty and the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[2] Consequently, Romania encourages all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to ratify its Amendment and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

(d) Romania organized, in cooperation with the Provisional Technical Secretariat, two seminars dedicated to the evaluation of the National Data Centres (Bucharest, October 2011 and June 2014). The main objective was to bring experts together to assess the activity of these centres and to find ways to continuously upgrade the system's capabilities;

(e) In 2013, Romania joined the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, where eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts, through their expertise, experience and political standing, support and complement efforts to promote the Treaty's entry into force, as well as reinvigorate international endeavours to achieve this goal;

(f) Romania presented its candidature, on behalf of the Eastern European Group, for the position of Chair of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in 2016, which is also the year marking the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty and the establishment of the Preparatory Commission;

(g) Romania is a full and active member of all export control arrangements in the nuclear field — the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee;

(h) Romania has also attached great importance to the exchange of views and the decisions adopted at the recent sessions of the General Assembly regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, supporting and co-sponsoring a number of resolutions dealing with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As part of its efforts to promote nuclear disarmament, Romania changed its voting position on the resolution in the First Committee on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (de-alerting), from abstention to voting in favour;

(i) All nuclear facilities, activities and materials in Romania are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) comprehensive safeguards agreements;

(j) Being among the states where the State-level concept in safeguards is applied successfully, Romania strongly supports further efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards (for example, the installation of remote monitoring systems, which permit a reduction in the number of times inspectors must travel to a facility);

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[1] Romania ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty through Law No. 152/1999, published in the Romanian Official Bulletin No. 478 of 4 October 1999.

[2] Romania ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material through Law No. 419/2006, published in the Romanian Official Bulletin No. 1008 of 19 December 2006.

(k) Romania is one of the beneficiaries of the Second Line of Defense programme, which is carried out by the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy of the United States of America with the aim of contributing to the improvement of States' capabilities to prevent, detect and ban illicit trafficking in radioactive material, including at the control points at borders. With reference to this programme, the Romanian Eastern border points (Albiţa, Galaţi) and the harbours (Agigea Sud and Constanţa) were secured. In this way, Romania has the capacity to detect radioactive material at the national borders;

(l) As a member State of the European Union, Romania is party to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and, since 2010, to the corresponding safeguards agreement and additional protocol to the safeguards agreement concluded in implementation of article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(m) Romania has used the IAEA peer-review services, being one of the countries that have benefited most from this form of external and independent assessment. Romania received Integrated Regulatory Review Service, Operational Safety Team, International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team, Emergency Preparedness Review and International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions, which made a significant contribution to the development of the national nuclear safety framework and practices. In March 2013, Romania requested support from IAEA to complete a nuclear energy system assessment;

(n) Romania is a strong supporter of the IAEA technical cooperation programme and of the statutory right of any Member State to be eligible for technical cooperation programmes. Romania pays in full and in time all its voluntary financial commitments for the Technical Cooperation Fund. For Romania, in-kind contribution to technical cooperation is a matter of constant development: sharing expertise with other Member States and supporting various IAEA missions with experts, co-financing of national and regional technical cooperation projects and planning to create a regional centre of excellence for nuclear safety;

(o) After the end of the current technical cooperation cycle 2014-2015, Romania intends to gradually reduce its national programmes with a final objective of progressing from the status of technical cooperation beneficiary to that of technical cooperation donor;

(p) Since June 2007, Romania has been implementing the integrated safeguards system, which is currently in place at the Cernavodă nuclear power plant, the nuclear fuel factory in Piteşti and the Feldioara power plant. Throughout this period, some activities were carried out with the aim of fully disseminating and obtaining a deep understanding of the legislative framework and with the purpose of strengthening the control of nuclear safeguards, for complying with the Euratom requirements;

(q) Romania supports the IAEA initiative for the establishment of a low enriched uranium bank, as a mechanism which would ensure the supply of low enriched uranium in order to discourage the establishment of domestic enrichment capabilities;

(r) In December 2012, Romania concluded the repatriation to the Russian Federation of EK-10 low enriched nuclear fuel from the reactor VVR-S (nuclear research and production of radioisotopes) installed at the National Institute of

Physics and Nuclear Engineering Horia Hulubei in Măgurele. The event took place under a decommissioning programme approved and funded by the Romanian Government. The entire quantity of spent nuclear fuel will be processed in the Russian Federation and the resulting radioactive waste will be stored therein. In this context, Romania reiterates its readiness to provide assistance/expertise in the form of lessons learned from the national experience in the areas of conversion from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium research reactors, high enriched uranium repatriation in the States of origin, radiological safety and the safety/security of radioactive sources;

(s) In March 2014, Romania participated in the Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague and assumed several unilateral commitments whose implementation results will be presented during the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit:

- Receiving an IAEA International Nuclear Security Advisory Service mission from 12 to 16 May 2014
- Hosting, in 2016, an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission as a follow-up to the mission conducted by IAEA in 2012. The recommendations issued by the Advisory Service are now under implementation. A practical exercise was also organized at the Cernavodă nuclear power plant
- Making a voluntary contribution of 30,000 euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

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Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Summary update to the reports submitted by Austria

1. In follow-up to Austrian reports to the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to specialized working papers and general oral reports submitted by Austria during meetings of the Preparatory Committee, and with reference to relevant working papers of the European Union and the Vienna Group of Ten, Austria presents the following update to the reports submitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/1) as well as the third session of the Preparatory Committee in 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.30) on national activities pursuant to action 20 of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference.

Nuclear disarmament

2. (2010 Final Document principles and objectives and action 1): In line with Austria's firm commitment to the principles and objectives of nuclear disarmament agreed to in 2010 as well as agreements reached in previous Review Conferences, Austria continued to underscore the importance of the concern expressed in the 2010 Final Document of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and the need to comply at all times with international law and international humanitarian law. Austria continued to work with interested States on joint statements on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament, the latest version of which is foreseen to be delivered by Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz at the 2015 Review Conference.

3. Austria hosted the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons on 8 and 9 December 2014 (www.hinw14vienna.at). Austria's motivation for hosting this Conference was concern about the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Among the many challenges the Treaty faces, the credibility deficit in the nuclear disarmament field is particularly damaging. Austria is convinced that unless credible progress on nuclear disarmament and a move away

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from nuclear weapons is achieved, further proliferation will be the inevitable consequence and nuclear dangers and risks will become even greater. Austria considers the humanitarian initiative and, consequently its decision to host the Vienna Conference, as a key implementation activity with regard to article VI and directly mandated by the 2010 principles and objectives, as well as action 1.

4. The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons was attended by 158 States, a broad spectrum of international organizations from the United Nations system, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, many academics and experts and several hundred representatives of civil society. The Conference was opened by Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Pope Francis addressed the Conference through important statements and messages. Victims of nuclear-weapon explosions gave testimonies of their harrowing experiences. In four sessions, experts from various fields addressed the short- and long-term consequences of nuclear weapons, the impact of nuclear testing, the risk drivers for deliberate or inadvertent nuclear weapons use, scenarios of nuclear weapons use and the associated challenges as well as an overview of the norms under existing international law pertaining to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons explosions.

5. The scientific facts, the evidence and the discussions which emerged at the Vienna Conference underscored that the humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons are far higher and graver than previously assumed, and that they should thus be at the centre of global efforts related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

6. Austria attempted to reflect the breadth of views that exist in the international community on the way forward in the Chair's summary, which was presented in her sole responsibility. The Chair's summary contains eight key substantive conclusions that have emerged in the humanitarian initiative of the past three years and the international conferences in Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico, and Vienna.

7. The Vienna Conference thus consolidated the substantive discussions that had taken place at the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Norway (March 2013), Mexico (February 2014) and Austria (December 2014) into a set of substantive and strong conclusions with respect to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with the existence of these weapons and the legal and moral dimension of this weaponry. This was intended to provide key input for future work on nuclear disarmament, including at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Consequently, Austria, together with a group of like-minded States, submitted a Working Paper to the 2015 Review Conference. The present document contains some of the key conclusions drawn from the scientific contributions made and discussions held at the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, as well as from recommendations for the 2015 Review Conference on the Treaty's implementation and the obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation under the Treaty.

8. Moreover, Austria issued a national pledge at the Vienna Conference that goes beyond the Chair's summary and contains the conclusions that Austria drew from the evidence presented in the course of the humanitarian conferences. Austria subsequently invited all interested States to associate themselves with this pledge in

order to further strengthen the humanitarian arguments and findings and to underscore the expectation of the international community for credible and urgent progress for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Austria submitted a working paper about the Vienna Conference, the findings contained in the Chair's summary and the Austrian pledge to the Review Conference.

9. (Actions 6, 7 and 9): Austria continued to support the revitalization of multilateral processes on nuclear disarmament, such as within the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Austria continued at the sixty-eighth and sixty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly its work together with like-mined States on the General Assembly resolution entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", which was adopted as resolution 67/56 in 2012.

10. Austria continued to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important contribution to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. In this spirit and in implementing action 9 of the 2010 action plan, Austria, together with Switzerland, co-funded a study by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt entitled "A nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe: concept — problems — chances" with a view to encouraging a discussion among experts and policymakers on the feasibility of the establishment of such a zone in Europe.

11. (Actions 12-14): Austria regularly promotes the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in political contacts with States that have not yet signed or ratified and has participated in all article XIV conferences as well as conferences organized by the "Group of Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Former Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs, Johannes Kyrle, participates actively in the newly established Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to assist with outreach efforts for the entry into force of the Treaty. Austria also continues to provide significant financial support for the "Science and Technology" conferences that have been organized every two years by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization since 2009, including the next one in June 2015. Austria considers the increased scientific and academic cooperation of the organization with relevant stakeholders as well as the further development of the civil and scientific benefits of the organization's verification system as very important and significant to ensure broad and continued support for the Treaty and the organization.

12. (Actions 19, 20 and 22): Continued support was extended to the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, in particular with regard to work to be done by the Vienna Office, which was established in 2012 and received substantial financial support. Austria also highly values the indispensable role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as evidenced by the excellent research and substantial contributions in the context of the international initiative on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, for which Austria provided financial support.

13. Austria continued its support for and close cooperation with the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, established in 2011 in cooperation between the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies. The Vienna Centre serves as an important think tank and platform for high-level discussion, research and dialogue on nuclear-related issues. It also acts as a catalyst for disarmament and non-proliferation education in a broader sense and

with a global impact. The Vienna Centre has had a significant and positive impact on strengthening the expertise and facilitating substantive engagement between States, civil society and experts in Vienna on a broad range of disarmament- and non-proliferation-related issues, especially with regard to the "Vienna issues".

14. Austria continues to support disarmament and non-proliferation education and training as a particularly valuable, necessary and sustainable contribution to global efforts in this field. In this context, the humanitarian initiative and the organization of the international conferences are particularly significant contributions to raising awareness about the complexity and also the urgency of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation against the background of the risk of devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons explosions. To this end, Austria considers it important to counter and complement the traditional security policy focus of the nuclear weapons discourse with a broader discussion on the consequences, risks, legality and morality of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is necessary to go beyond the community of arms control experts and to open up the debate on nuclear weapons to other expert constituencies, civil society and the wider public. This is essential to reinforcing the understanding of the taboo against nuclear weapons, as global trends and current geopolitical developments only underscore the importance for the entire international community to focus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with an even greater sense of urgency. In addition, Austria co-hosted and/or co-organized several disarmament education events and supported civil society activities in this field.

Non-proliferation

15. Regarding actions 23, 24-29, 32-34, 35-39 and 40-46, Austria would like to refer to the implementation information provided in the national reports submitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 2013 and the third session of the Preparatory Committee in 2014, as well as relevant statements and working papers submitted on behalf of the European Union.

16. (Actions 35 and 36): In fulfilling the responsibility to ensure that nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty, Austria continued to diligently apply the understandings of the Zangger Committee as well as the guidelines developed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Austria welcomes the increasing adherence to export controls and is in the process of examining opportunities offered by this development with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

17. In order to strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group as an effective arrangement in the field of non-proliferation and export controls, Austria, together with Germany and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, hosted an international workshop entitled "The future of Nuclear Suppliers Group participation and adherence" on 8 and 9 January 2015. The primary topic of the workshop was the impact of widening participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in particular to countries that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the non-proliferation and export control regimes. Almost 120 experts registered for the workshop. They came from 39 Nuclear Suppliers Group participating Governments and four States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty not participating in the

Group, as well as from think tanks, institutions, industry and export control arrangements.

Peaceful uses

18. Regarding actions 47 to 64, Austria would like to refer to the implementation information provided in the national reports submitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 2013 and the third session of the Preparatory Committee in 2014, as well as relevant statements and working papers submitted on behalf of the European Union.

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National report on the implementation of actions 5, 20, and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

1. As provided in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, or P5, are working to implement action 5 to "further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence" and to make national reports on our action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 Treaty Preparatory Committee under a common framework, consistent with actions 20 and 21.

2. Action 21 states: "As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security". The framework we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it addresses all three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. We encourage all States parties, consistent with action 20, to make similar reports.

Key statements

4. The United Kingdom is committed to a world without nuclear weapons in line with our obligations under article VI of the Treaty and firmly believes that the best way to achieve this goal is through gradual disarmament negotiated using a step-by-step approach and within the framework of the United Nations disarmament machinery and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

5. We believe that the Treaty should remain the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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6. We see entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and completion of its verification regime; the start and early conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament; and universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as essential steps on the road to complete global nuclear disarmament.

7. We remain determined to continue to work with partners across the international community to prevent proliferation and to make progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States, and to take tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world, in which countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them.

8. The United Kingdom has a strong record on nuclear disarmament. We have steadily reduced the size of our own nuclear forces by well over 50 per cent since our Cold War peak and since 1998 all of our air-delivered nuclear weapons have been withdrawn and dismantled.

9. Our nuclear forces peaked in the late 1970s, with a total of about 460 warheads of varying types and delivery systems. In May 2010, we announced that this figure would continue to reduce to a total stockpile of no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s.

10. We now have just one delivery system provided by four ballistic missile submarines and we have cut the number of nuclear warheads onboard each deployed Vanguard class submarine from 48 to 40, while reducing the number of operational (Trident) missiles on each submarine to no more than 8. These changes have now been completed across the ballistic missile submarine fleet. We have now achieved our 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review commitment to reduce the number of operationally available warheads to no more than 120.

11. Maintaining and renewing elements of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent capability, such as the submarine, is fully consistent with our international obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That Treaty does not prohibit the maintenance of nuclear-weapon systems currently held by the nuclear-weapon States and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not set out any timetable for the fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty. As long as the global security environment makes it necessary for the United Kingdom to retain nuclear weapons, we have a responsibility to maintain the safety and reliability of all elements of the capability, including through replacement and updating of obsolete elements of the system as they reach the end of their operational life.

12. We strongly welcome the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia, ratified in 2011, which will impose limits for each party of 1,550 deployed strategic offensive warheads from February 2018. However, there is still more to be done. We encourage all States with nuclear weapons to continue their efforts to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals, but especially those with the largest numbers.

13. The nuclear posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in which deterrence is shared but the nuclear powers maintain full custody of their nuclear weapons, fully conforms with articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which prohibit the transfer of control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons States. The United Kingdom and the

United States are both fully committed to their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including those relating to disarmament under article VI, as indeed are all NATO Allies.

14. We initiated the P5 process in 2009 to build mutual understanding between the nuclear-weapon States. We do not always see eye to eye on all issues but we are working hard to increase mutual trust and transparency as these are essential prerequisites to further more ambitious steps. We urge all States that have not yet done so, to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear weapons States.

15. We will continue to try to make nuclear weapons less necessary, with the goal of making them unnecessary. However, the United Kingdom will retain a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation makes it necessary. As set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010, we consider that our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats.

I. Reporting on national measures relating to disarmament

16. The United Kingdom considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be the cornerstone of global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and we are committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference and reaffirmed at the 2010 Review Conference.

National security policies, doctrine, and activities associated with nuclear weapons

Nuclear doctrine

17. The 2006 white paper "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent",[1] as amended by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review,[2] provides our current policy on nuclear deterrence, our capability and force structure. It makes clear that we will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control, in the form of continuous-at-sea patrols by Vanguard-class submarines carrying Trident ballistic missiles with the fewest warheads since the introduction of our fleet of ballistic missile submarines capability in the 1960s.

18. We believe we already have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads among the recognized nuclear-weapons States, and remain the only P5 nation to have reduced to a single deterrent system comprised of four fleet of ballistic missile submarines, since the withdrawal of our air component in the late 1990s.

19. The United Kingdom shares the concern regarding the humanitarian consequences which could result from the use of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom works extremely hard to prevent the use of nuclear weapons; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and to ensure our own nuclear weapons are safe and secure.

[1] The Future-of-the United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent: Defence White Paper-2006.

[2] The Strategic Defence and Security Review: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty.

Trident Alternatives Review

20. In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review,[3] the Government confirmed its commitment to maintaining a continuous submarine-based deterrent and to beginning the work of replacing its existing submarines. As part of the Coalition Programme for Government,[4] it was agreed that the Liberal Democrats would continue to make the case for alternatives. As a result, in 2011 the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister jointly commissioned a focused review into alternative systems and postures.

21. The review was a neutral, factual review of options to examine whether there are:

- Credible alternatives to a submarine-based deterrent
- Credible submarine-based alternatives to the current proposal
- Alternative nuclear postures

22. The United Kingdom Government policy remains as set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. We will maintain a continuous deterrent and are proceeding with the programme to build a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines. Final decisions on the successor submarines will be taken in 2016 at the Main Gate point of the acquisition programme.

Operational policy

23. The United Kingdom has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies. While we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, we have provided some parameters.

24. In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the United Kingdom strengthened its negative security assurance to state that the United Kingdom will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In giving this assurance, we emphasized the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty, and noted that this assurance would not apply to any State in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. We also noted that while there is currently no direct threat to the United Kingdom or its vital interests from States developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.

25. In the interests of international security and stability, the United Kingdom has taken steps to lower the operational status of our deterrent system. United Kingdom nuclear weapons are not on high alert, nor are they on "launch on warning" status. The patrol submarine operates routinely at a "notice to fire" measured in days rather than minutes as it did throughout the Cold War. The missiles are no longer targeted at any country. On 15 February 1994, a Joint Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation [Boris Yeltsin] and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of

[3] 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

[4] Coalition Programme for Government.

Great Britain and Northern Ireland [John Major] [declared that they would] "ensure the adoption of all necessary measures so that the strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands will be de-targeted not later than 30 May 1994". This position was considered and reaffirmed during the work in the 2006 White Paper. We believe that a nuclear attack on the United Kingdom's vital interests is deterred by demonstrating our capability to respond under any circumstances, rather than just by the ability for a rapid response. There is no immediacy of launch in our normal operating posture.

26. The security and safety of our nuclear weapons is given the very highest priority and is entirely consistent with our obligations under non-proliferation agreements. Robust arrangements are in place for the political control of United Kingdom's strategic nuclear deterrent. There are a number of technological and procedural safeguards built into the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent to prevent an unauthorized launch of its Trident missiles.

27. Finally, the United Kingdom has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions since 1991.

Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification

Stockpile size

28. The United Kingdom has achieved substantial reductions in its nuclear-weapon stockpile. In the late 1970s, when the United Kingdom's stockpile was at its highest, the United Kingdom had more than 400 warheads in-service across five types. Following the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United Kingdom announced in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review that the number of deployed warheads on each submarine would be reduced from 48 to 40; the number of operational missiles in the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines would be reduced to no more than 8; and we would reduce the number of operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120.

29. On 20 January 2015, in a written statement delivered to Parliament, the Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon) announced that the United Kingdom Government had now met their commitment to implement these changes across the United Kingdom ballistic missile submarine fleets. All Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine fleets on continuous at-sea deterrent patrol now carry 40 nuclear warheads and no more than 8 operational missiles. We have therefore achieved our commitment to reduce the number of operationally available warheads to no more than 120 [All nuclear material no longer deemed necessary for military purposes has been placed under safeguards of international civil standards].

Verification

30. Developing and agreeing effective measures for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads will be an important precondition for fulfilling the goals of article VI of the Treaty. The United Kingdom-Norway Initiative is an example of the world-leading research the United Kingdom is undertaking to address some of the technical and procedural challenges posed by effective verification of warhead dismantlement. In 2007, representatives from several Norwegian laboratories, the

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Establishment the Verification Research Training and Information Centre, a non-governmental organization, met to discuss potential cooperation on matters connected with technical verification of nuclear-arms reductions, with an agreement that a programme of work in this field should be progressed. This was the first time that a nuclear-weapon State, a non-nuclear weapon State, and an independent non-governmental organization have collaborated in this field of research. In 2012, the United Kingdom hosted a P5 expert-level meeting on verification to discuss lessons learned from the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative to date.

31. We are in our second decade of an active partnership with the United States of America in monitoring and verification research. Our joint technical cooperation programme allows us to apply policy, technology and programme expertise to develop and evaluate targeted approaches for transparent reductions and monitoring of nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities for potential disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. Technical experts conduct activities and share information to explore and address essential and difficult monitoring and verification challenges, working to integrate potential approaches for arms control monitoring and transparency.

32. The United Kingdom and China have conducted reciprocal technical exchange visits and will continue to explore collaborative exchanges into arms control and verification research. The United Kingdom has also offered the other P5 nations the opportunity to visit some aspects of the facilities available at the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Establishment.

Transparency and confidence-building measures

33. Through the Strategic Defence and Security Review and other documents, the United Kingdom has voluntarily declared its maximum warhead stockpile numbers and operational warhead numbers.

34. We have also expressed our unconditional support for the 2010 action plan at numerous forums. In line with this support, the United Kingdom actively participates in regular working-level meetings of the P5 nuclear-weapon States that advance our collective dialogue on disarmament and review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United Kingdom held the first P5 Conference in 2009, and started the second cycle of Conferences in February 2015.

35. The United Kingdom actively promotes its work on the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative to non-nuclear-weapon States. This has included hosting a joint United Kingdom-Norway workshop for 12 non-nuclear-weapon States in December 2011 and side events at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees. Another side event was held at the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

Nuclear glossary

36. The P5 are, under China's leadership, developing a glossary of nuclear terms to aid understanding between States in discussing related matters. The United

Kingdom has strongly supported the authoring of this glossary and looks forward to using this multilingual handbook in future work.

International agreements

37. The United Kingdom has signed a number of bilateral agreements as confidence-building measures with P5 partners. In addition to those mentioned previously, in 1977, the United Kingdom signed an agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the prevention of accidental nuclear war, and establishment of a direct communication link between the residence of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Kremlin, in 1967.

38. At the France-United Kingdom Summit in November 2010, as part of the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty, a subordinate treaty was declared, namely the Teutates Treaty. As part of the treaty, both the United Kingdom and France agreed to build and jointly operate radiographic and hydrodynamic testing facilities, reaffirming their rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and their commitments under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It was agreed that through the Treaty, the United Kingdom and France would cooperate and share information on safety and security of nuclear weapons; stockpile certification; and counter nuclear or radiological terrorism.[5]

Non-civil nuclear material

39. The United Kingdom takes nuclear security most seriously and applies the same rigour to enforcing compliance to prevent the theft or sabotage of non-civil nuclear materials as it does to the civil nuclear industry. At defence sites, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Armed Forces performs an equivalent role to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary in the stringent enforcement of nuclear security standards. Non-civil site security is at least as robust as the protection of civil material, and is in line with guidance such as the International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). The United Kingdom works closely with international partners to ensure the application of common international security standards, for example through reciprocal peer reviews of security and best practice exchanges.

Other related issues

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

40. The United Kingdom recognizes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a key element of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and provides extensive technical and political support to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The United Kingdom maintains the United Kingdom National Data Centre, Eskdalemuir Seismometer Array, a number of other International Monitoring Systems stations throughout United Kingdom territories and 1 of 16 global radionuclide laboratories that provide analytical support to the International Monitoring Systems. These facilities are

[5] Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228571/7975.pdf.

backed up by enduring research in a number of areas, notably through the Atomic Weapons Establishment's Forensic Seismology Team. In addition, the United Kingdom was heavily involved in preparations for Integrated Field Exercise 2014, which evaluated the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's On-Site Inspection capability.

41. The United Kingdom is active in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's Working Groups in Vienna and has provided over £100,000 in support over the past five years for the finance-focused Advisory Group. Our work ensures that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has the necessary funding and working time to build and maintain an effective monitoring regime.

Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

42. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United Kingdom has upheld a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom has been conducted under international safeguards. We are committed to the pursuit of an international treaty that would put an end to the future production of fissile material for such purposes. We made a commitment in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference to begin negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

43. The United Kingdom supported the resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly in 2012 to create a fissile material cut-off treaty Group of Government Experts. The Group, in which we are pleased to have a United Kingdom expert participating, complements existing efforts to find a positive way forward on the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the three sessions of the Group of Government Experts have made a strong and constructive contribution to the process and we look forward to the final report.

Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation

Safeguards

44. All civil nuclear material in the United Kingdom is subject to the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) safeguards and to the terms of the United Kingdom/Euratom/IAEA tripartite safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Euratom safeguards obligations stem from chapter VII (articles 77-85) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,[6] which requires the European Commission, inter alia, to satisfy itself that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by users. This is achieved through:

- A requirement that all operators of nuclear installations provide the Commission with Basic Technical Characteristics describing the location and intended activities of their installation

[6] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12006A/12006A.htm.

- A requirement that operators keep and report nuclear material accountancy records
- Provision for the Commission to inspect installations and records
- Provision for the imposition of sanctions by the Commission in the event of infringement of the Treaty safeguards obligations. These sanctions can range from a published written warning to withdrawal of the nuclear material concerned.

45. The various reporting requirements are amplified in Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/05.[7] Euratom safeguards do not apply to nuclear material intended to meet defence requirements.

Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement

46. The United Kingdom Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement[8] with the IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978. The agreement allows for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Nuclear materials accountancy reports on all civil nuclear material in facilities are provided to the IAEA by Euratom, and the IAEA may "designate" any facility, or part thereof, for inspection. Currently, some of the plutonium stores at Sellafield and the gas centrifuge enrichment facilities at Capenhurst are designated for IAEA inspection. The agreement gives the United Kingdom the right to remove facilities and/or withdraw nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for reasons of national security. However, as part of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the United Kingdom agreed that any future withdrawals from safeguards would "be limited to small quantities of nuclear materials not suitable for explosive purposes" and undertook to publish information on any such withdrawals.[9]

Additional Protocol

47. The United Kingdom Additional Protocol[10] to the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement is based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/540 and Corr.1), and contains measures aimed at the primary objectives of Additional Protocols — to increase the capability of IAEA to detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon States or to increase the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Information, and associated access, is therefore provided on all Protocol-relevant activities that are done in collaboration with or are otherwise relevant to a non-nuclear-weapon State, or where the information would improve the effectiveness or efficiency of IAEA safeguards in the United Kingdom.

Export controls

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

48. The United Kingdom has worked hard to fully implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As one of the vice-

[7] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_054/l_05420050228en00010070.pdf.

[8] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc263.pdf.

[9] http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/safeguards/withdrawals.htm.

[10] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc263a1.pdf.

chairs of the Committee adopted pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the United Kingdom works with States Members of the United Nations to strengthen efforts to promote universal implementation of the resolution. We work with and through international organizations and initiatives, including the IAEA and the G8 Global Partnership, to provide technical and financial support to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials, knowledge and know-how in partner countries; facilitate debate and deliver training to help build partners' engagement and capacities; and maintain domestic technical and scientific expertise in counter proliferation, arms control and chemical, biological and nuclear security. United Kingdom export controls and enforcement capability enable us to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to strengthen international export controls.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

49. By fulfilling its obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, the United Kingdom contributes to minimizing nuclear proliferation while ensuring that eligible States are able to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The United Kingdom implements effective strategic export controls in regard to its nuclear transfers in line with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee control lists. Relevant exports are assessed against the Consolidated European Union and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and stated United Kingdom Government export control policies. A robust enforcement system, underpinned by Export Control Order 2008,[11] operates to deter attempts to breach the controls and help to facilitate legitimate transfers.

50. The United Kingdom also actively supports the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee. The United Kingdom contributed extensive technical expertise to the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group three-year-long fundamental review of its control lists, and continues this through the newly established Technical Experts Group, ensuring that the Nuclear Suppliers Group control lists reflect changing proliferation threats. We also share licensing and enforcement information with fellow participating Governments, both ad hoc and at the Licensing and Enforcement and Information Exchange Meetings.

51. In 2013 the United Kingdom authored a paper entitled "Good practices for corporate standards to support the efforts of the international community in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". It was agreed at the 31st Consultative Group meeting and posted on the Nuclear Suppliers Group public website shortly thereafter. The paper recognizes the important role that the diverse commercial sector can play in assisting multilateral efforts in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United Kingdom has supported Nuclear Suppliers Group outreach activities with emerging technology holders.

Nuclear security

52. The United Kingdom security regime for the civil nuclear industry is robust and effective and fully meets international standards. Security arrangements are based on the principles of the graded approach and defence in depth and are kept under constant review.

[11] https://www.gov.uk/export-control-order-2008.

53. In 2010 the United Kingdom deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Although the 2005 amendment has not yet entered into force, the United Kingdom has in place legislation which implements it.

54. In 2013 the United Kingdom extended the scope of its security regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account of the United Kingdom's new nuclear build programme. The legislation had previously regulated operating civil nuclear sites. Revised guidance was issued to the industry by the United Kingdom's nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in October 2012, which is a key step towards an increasingly more outcome-focused regulatory regime for security in the civil nuclear industry. By the end of January 2014 all nuclear premises regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation Civil Nuclear Security had National Objectives Requirements Model Standards compliant approved Nuclear Site Security Plans.

55. Following on from pledges at the 2010 Washington and 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summits, at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague, the United Kingdom made a number of commitments to continue tackling the threat of nuclear terrorism, including:

- Continuing our Global Threat Reduction Programme of financial and expert assistance for nuclear and radiological security improvements overseas. Since 2010, our experts have assisted more than 20 countries, embedding high standards worldwide
- Contributing £3.4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2014, bringing the total United Kingdom contribution since 2010 to more than £12 million
- Contributing £500,000 to Interpol's Operation Fail Safe to track the movements of individuals involved in the illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material

Nuclear information security

56. The United Kingdom has promoted the need to secure sensitive nuclear information within the framework of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Partnership and the IAEA.

Key attributes of an excellent nuclear security culture

57. In 2012 the United Kingdom established a tripartite sub-group (with representatives from the regulator, industry and government) to develop a better understanding of the attributes of an excellent security culture, and for this to be captured and codified. The output of this work is a guidance document[12] which was published in June 2013. The guide sets out key attributes deemed necessary for an excellent security culture and then sets out for each one what is required to achieve this. The implementation of the recommendations in the guide is not compulsory, but is intended to inform and enhance understanding of how all parties (regulator, industry and government) can deliver to meet the objective.

[12] https://www.nuclear.nsacademy.co.uk/system/files/0034%20Spooner%20Security%20Culture%20Leaflet.pdf.

International Physical Protection Advisory Service

58. The United Kingdom was the first nuclear-weapon State to welcome an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission. A Mission Team visited the Sellafield civil nuclear site and Barrow port in October 2011, and concluded that the state of civil nuclear security is robust. The team identified many examples of good practice within the civil nuclear security regime and made a number of valuable recommendations. In March 2014 the United Kingdom Government invited the IAEA to send a follow-up International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission to the United Kingdom, which was planned to take place in 2016. The United Kingdom provides security experts who participate in a number of outward International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

59. The United Kingdom continues to support the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones. As previously stated in 1995 and 2010, we recognize the role that negative security assurances can play in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security.

Existing zones

60. To date, the United Kingdom has signed and ratified Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), and the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa). There are 74 States, therefore, that already have in place protocols that provide legally binding negative security assurances from the United Kingdom. We also support the parallel political declarations adopted by the Nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia concerning that country's nuclear-weapon-free status.

Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

61. We will continue to pursue signing protocols to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones as a practical way of strengthening our existing negative security assurances. The United Kingdom therefore welcomed the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in May 2014. Under this Protocol, the nuclear-weapon States will extend legally binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State party to that Treaty and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of that Treaty or its Protocol. The United Kingdom has now completed its ratification of the Protocol.

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

62. In conjunction with other nuclear-weapon States, the United Kingdom will continue to engage with the State parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in order to allow signature of a Protocol to that Treaty in the near future.

Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone

63. The United Kingdom reiterates its commitment to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, as one of the sponsors of the text of that resolution, is working hard to deliver against the practical steps agreed in 2010. As well as the considerable time and effort of officials, the United Kingdom Government has also provided financial support: in 2013/14 the United Kingdom gave £100,000 towards the Facilitator's office, and has committed a further £100,000 in 2014/15. We look forward to convening an inclusive conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as soon as the practical arrangements for that conference are agreed by the States of the region. We will continue to work with all the States of the region, our fellow Co-conveners and the Facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, to encourage progress towards this common goal.

Compliance and other related issues/concerns

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

64. The United Kingdom has been fully supportive of all Security Council resolutions relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Presidential Statement of 16 April 2012, made in the wake of the satellite launch of 13 April 2012. We continue to support the United Nations Democratic People's Republic of Korea Panel of Experts in their work, and have reported violations of Democratic People's Republic of Korea sanctions to the Panel. Our work to raise awareness of existing Democratic People's Republic of Korea sanctions and to encourage implementation is ongoing. The United Kingdom has funded the International Institute of Strategic Studies to run workshops in partnership with the Panel of Experts to raise awareness of Democratic People's Republic of Korea sanctions and encourage implementation in both the public and private sector. In 2013 workshops were held in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Hong Kong. We plan to continue this work.

65. The United Kingdom is not a member of the Six-Party Talks, nor are we seeking involvement in discussions. However, given the risk of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme to international security, we are maintaining close contact with all sides. We have made clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that if it carries out any further provocations, the international community will respond robustly. However, we have also been clear that if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea takes concrete steps to resolve the nuclear issue, there will be a positive response.

Other contributions to nuclear-weapons non-proliferation

The Islamic Republic of Iran

66. The United Kingdom remains concerned about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, we are committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The United Kingdom has adopted a dual track strategy of pressure and engagement. We have supported six Security Council resolutions which prohibit Iran from all reprocessing, heavy water and enrichment-related activity, most recently resolution 1929 (2010), adopted in June 2010. We continue to call on Iran to fully comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions s, and to call on all States Members of the United Nations to implement Security Council resolutions fully. We actively support the work of the United Nations Iran

Panel of Experts. We have also implemented European Union sanctions on Iran which go beyond these measures. In addition, the United Kingdom has played an active role in P5+1 negotiations with Iran and we welcome the extension of the Joint Plan of Action between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2014, as well as Iran's substantive engagement in talks to reach a Comprehensive Agreement.

67. The United Kingdom shares the IAEA's "serious concerns" about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme owing to the credible information available to it which indicates that Iran had carried out activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear device". As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, the United Kingdom supported two IAEA Board resolutions in 2011 and 2012 which stress that it is essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue to resolve all outstanding substantive issues. We continue to support the IAEA in its tireless efforts to address these issues. We welcome the agreement of a Joint Statement on a Framework for cooperation between Iran and the Agency in November 2013, in which Iran agreed to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency. We are, however, disappointed with the lack of progress made owing to Iran's unwillingness to cooperate fully. We continue to call on Iran to address fully the substance of all of the Agency's outstanding concerns including by granting access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested.

68. The United Kingdom is committed to successful negotiations between the E3+3 and Iran, and as a sign of support, has to date contributed over £435,000 towards the IAEA's additional and intensive verification activities, and has committed a further £400,000 to support the Agency's work during the extension to the end of June 2015.

Global Partnership

69. The United Kingdom makes a major contribution to the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and in 2013 the United Kingdom held the Chair of the Global Partnership. Under the United Kingdom Chair, the Global Partnership established mechanisms to better match Global Partnership partners' funds and expertise with specific security requirements, and improve project coordination and implementation. We also held an outreach event with the experts of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to encourage universal reporting by States (in line with resolution obligations). From 2002-2012, the United Kingdom committed over £350 million of funding to Global Partnership projects.

70. The United Kingdom's largest contribution to the Global Partnership is through the Global Threat Reduction programme. We are working on Global Threat Reduction programmes that aim to:

- Improve the security of fissile materials
- Reduce the number of sites containing sensitive nuclear and radiological material and improve security of remaining sites
- Strengthen the security culture of sites and organizations dealing with sensitive nuclear and radiological material or information
- Help prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear or radiological material
- Prevent terrorists acquiring proliferation-relevant information and expertise

Academic Technology Approval Scheme

71. In the United Kingdom, the Academic Technology Approval Scheme seeks to stop the spread of knowledge and skills from academic programmes that could be used in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

72. Academic institutions have a mandatory obligation to comply with United Kingdom visa requirements. Obtaining a certificate under the scheme is a requirement for all students applying for student visas and intending to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for more than six months to undertake post-graduate studies or research in certain designated subjects.

Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Promoting peaceful uses

73. The United Kingdom fully supports the inalienable right of all States parties to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in a culture of openness, transparency and confidence and believes in the responsible, safe and secure access to civil nuclear energy worldwide, subject to the State being in conformity with the non-proliferation requirements of the Treaty.

74. We note the increasing demand for civil nuclear energy and stress its potential in addressing climate change and in providing energy security. Furthermore, we support the work of the IAEA in facilitating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable development and in addressing vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture and industry.

Developments in civil nuclear energy

75. The United Kingdom recognizes the importance of civil nuclear energy, not least as civil nuclear power facilities need to sit alongside other low carbon forms of electricity generation. The United Kingdom has been clear that civil nuclear energy will be a key part of our future low carbon energy mix. It also offers us a cost-effective pathway to meet our legally binding carbon targets. The United Kingdom's commitment to civil nuclear power is evident in the steps which have been taken in the last year in relation to the new build programme in the United Kingdom. This is being done without subsidy from the Government, but work is being done to secure the long-term commercial investment needed.

Nuclear Industrial Strategy

76. The United Kingdom has taken several steps over the past year to continue our efforts in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We published the Nuclear Industrial Strategy in March 2013, which identified priorities for Government and industry to work together in a long-term partnership. It aims to provide more opportunities for economic growth and create jobs through an increased share of all aspects of the civil nuclear market. One of the main points in the strategy was the creation of the Nuclear Industry Council, which brings together all the key players across the civil nuclear supply chain. The Council will be looking at a number of issues essential to the success of our civil nuclear sector in the future: skills, trade and investment, business capability and how the public perceives the civil nuclear industry.

The Energy Act

77. The United Kingdom Government also recognizes the importance of an independent and robust regulatory regime and is committed to creating the highest standards of civil nuclear regulation. To that end, it has embarked on steps to enhance the United Kingdom's civil nuclear regulatory framework, to ensure it remains world class and has the flexibility to be able to address future challenges. The Energy Act, which gained Royal Assent in December 2013, includes provisions to establish the Office for Nuclear Regulation (created in 2011, as a statutory, independent regulator). The Office brings together the functions of civil nuclear safety, security, safeguards implementation, radioactive materials transport, and health and safety on civil nuclear sites. It began operating as a statutory body on 1 April 2014.

Memorandums of understanding

78. The United Kingdom Government is keen to enhance the links between the United Kingdom and other countries around the world with a view to enhancing civil nuclear energy cooperation. We made several high profile announcements in this regard last year. These include the signing of Memorandums of Understanding with various countries focusing on, inter alia, setting the strategic framework for collaboration on investment, technology, construction and expertise in civil nuclear energy, and exploring bilateral cooperation opportunities.

79. The United Kingdom Government has several mechanisms through which civil nuclear energy cooperation is enabled, including Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding. In addition to bilateral agreements, we are also party to Euratom cooperation agreements. Our activities in this area indicate a clear intent for the United Kingdom to work with various countries across a range of relevant civil nuclear energy-related activities, and we are in discussion with several other States regarding how civil nuclear energy cooperation can be enhanced bilaterally.

Nuclear fuel assurance

80. The United Kingdom fully supports moves to create a menu of viable and credible assurances of fuel supply, which would enable a new nuclear State to avoid the need to develop expensive and complex indigenous enrichment technologies. The United Kingdom's Nuclear Fuel Assurance proposal, a response to the IAEA's request for Multilateral Nuclear Approaches, was adopted at the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2011. This is one practical approach which ensures that States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have access to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy, while upholding high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The United Kingdom views all Multilateral Nuclear Approaches proposals as complementary, and hopes that States are able to select proposals which contribute best to their energy mix.

Technical assistance through the IAEA to its member States

81. The United Kingdom is committed to supporting the IAEA's technical cooperation programme and demonstrates this by paying our contributions to the technical cooperation fund promptly and in full on an annual basis. We are involved in the ongoing discussions regarding the technical cooperation programme and are

keen to ensure that it continues to improve, fulfil its potential and provide the vital work that it undertakes.

82. The United Kingdom is very supportive of the contribution that the technical cooperation programme makes towards the Millennium Development Goals. The good work that the technical cooperation programme can achieve should not be underestimated and it has made numerous, positive contributions to the peaceful uses of nuclear-related technologies in many countries around the world.

83. The United Kingdom is encouraging the IAEA to continue to ensure results-based management and "sustainable" outcomes, accountability, transparency and synergies in the technical cooperation programme.

Nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability

84. The United Kingdom is a strong supporter of coordinated international efforts towards the continuous improvement of nuclear safety across the globe. As part of our commitment to achieving high nuclear safety standards the United Kingdom aims to show a leadership role in meeting its obligations as a Contracting Party to relevant international nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. In particular we are playing a leading role in proposing possible measures to strengthen the Convention on Nuclear Safety peer review processes.

85. Additionally, the United Kingdom has been a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention on nuclear third party liability and the Brussels Supplementary Convention since the 1960s. The Paris and Brussels Conventions were revised by amending Protocols in 2004. The United Kingdom is committed to implementing the changes and plans to lay legislation in 2015.

86. The United Kingdom actively encourages all States with civil nuclear programmes, or those thinking about developing one, to join a nuclear liability regime and to become Contracting Parties to the relevant international instruments and in particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention.

Other related issues

87. No additional material.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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National implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Brazil

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to action 20 of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)). Action 20 established the obligation of all States parties to regularly report on the implementation of the 2010 action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. States parties also agreed that increased transparency and openness to cooperation is needed in order to fulfil the Treaty's objectives. Brazil is thoroughly committed to this exercise and expects it will lead to improved discussions on the implementation of the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

Action 1: All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

2. Brazil continues to be fully committed to implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the objectives of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While Brazil believes that nuclear non-proliferation has been a success story under the Treaty, it considers that much remains to be done in terms of nuclear disarmament. In this context, Brazil has been a proactive advocate of nuclear disarmament, either in a national capacity or as a member of thematic coalitions and regional groupings, such as the New Agenda Coalition, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), in all nuclear disarmament-related forums, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process,

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the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the First Committee of the General Assembly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Brazil attaches the utmost priority to the urgent commencement of multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive convention banning the development, production, possession and use of nuclear weapons and providing for the verified, transparent and irreversible disposal of all existing nuclear arsenals, within an agreed timeframe.

Action 2: All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

3. Brazil is thoroughly committed to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in all its policies regarding nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All the nuclear material in Brazil is doubly verified. It is subject to the control of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials for the Application of Safeguards ("Quadripartite Agreement"). under the terms of the bilateral agreement between Brazil and Argentina and to comprehensive safeguards by IAEA according to the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement between the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, IAEA, Brazil and Argentina. The bilateral nuclear process starting in the mid-1980s has become an inalienable asset of the strategic partnership of the two countries, demonstrating their unwavering commitment to the exclusively peaceful uses of the atom and paving the way for the successful cooperation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency with IAEA in the implementation of comprehensive safeguards for the past 20 years.

Action 6: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

Practical step 4: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

4. Brazil considers the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons and completely eliminate nuclear arsenals within a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner and an agreed time frame the foremost priority of the Conference on Disarmament.

5. Within the Conference on Disarmament, Brazil has firmly supported an agreement on a programme of work that would allow it to commence substantive negotiations on all of its core issues, including nuclear disarmament. In this vein, Brazil has actively supported proposals of several of the presidencies of the Conference on possible programmes of work.

6. Brazil has further reinforced the call for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament at different multilateral forums, including the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the preparatory committees, in a

national capacity and as a member of UNASUR, CELAC and the New Agenda Coalition.

Action 7: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

7. Brazil has consistently voiced its call for nuclear-weapon States to give unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, not only in the Conference on Disarmament but also in other disarmament forums, such as the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the preparatory committees for the Review Conferences, and the Review Conferences. It is Brazil's view that effective guarantees can only be achieved through a legally binding instrument. Brazil has supported all initiatives to approve a programme of work on the Conference on Disarmament, which includes the issue of the so-called "negative security assurances".

Action 9: The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

8. Brazil is a party to the pioneering treaty that established the first denuclearized zone in a densely populated area of the planet, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and is ready to continue to contribute to efforts leading to the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones around the world. Brazil has consistently called on the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw reservations and interpretative declarations to Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to the Protocols to other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties as they are incompatible with the objectives of such treaties and with nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brazil has, along with New Zealand, submitted biennially to the First Committee of the General Assembly the resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", which has enjoyed overwhelming support. Brazil also participates in the meetings of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, including the Third Conference to be held on 24 April 2015.

9. Brazil has consistently supported the convening of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Brazil has voiced its frustration with the postponement of that Conference in 2012 and expects it to be convened as soon as possible. Brazil

believes that the establishment of such a zone can make an invaluable contribution to peace and stability in the region.

Action 11: Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.

Action 12: All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.

Action 13: All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.

Practical step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

10. Brazil signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and ratified it two years later, in 1998, one of the first States to do so.

11. Brazil fully supports and actively participates in the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conferences). Brazil has made statements at both the seventh (2011) and eighth (2013) Conferences, outlining its priorities on the matter and reaffirming its commitment to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Brazil also adhered to the joint ministerial statements issued at the fifth, sixth and seventh meetings of the Ministerial Meeting in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 2010, 2012 and 2014, respectively.

12. Moreover, Brazil consistently calls on all countries that have not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, particularly annex 2 countries, to do so as a matter of urgency. Brazil has repeated this call over the years in bilateral talks and in multilateral forums, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly, both in its national capacity and as a member of UNASUR, CELAC and the New Agenda Coalition. Brazil has repeatedly raised the issue that, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, all countries should refrain from actions that may undermine its goals, in particular those related to the modernization of nuclear arsenals. Such actions include, in Brazil's view, the development of subcritical tests, which in spirit, if not in the letter, go against the objectives of the Treaty.

Action 14: The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring

system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.

13. Out of the seven facilities of the international monitoring system of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Brazilian territory, six are already in routine operation: a Primary Seismic Station (PS07, Brasília); a Infrasound Station (IS09, Brasília); a Radionuclide Station with noble gas system (RN11, Rio de Janeiro); a Radionuclide Laboratory (RL04, Rio de Janeiro); and two Auxiliary Seismic Stations (AS10, Pitinga and AS11, Riachuelo). The seventh facility, Radionuclide Station (RN12, Recife), is currently under construction. Brazilian experts have taken part in several training activities offered by the Preparatory Commission and actively participated in the integrated field exercise, held in Jordan in 2014, thus contributing to the development of the on-site inspection capability of the Preparatory Commission.

Action 15: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Practical step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

14. Although Brazil prioritizes the negotiation of a comprehensive convention on nuclear disarmament, it has also favoured negotiations on a fissile material treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and supported different initiatives to find a consensus formula that would make it possible to overcome the current stalemate in that body. It is Brazil's view that a fissile material treaty would only be meaningful as a disarmament measure if it would deal in one way or another with the issue of pre-existing stockpiles of fissile material.

15. In the absence of progress in the Conference on Disarmament, Brazil has favoured General Assembly resolution 67/53, by which the Assembly established a group of governmental experts to make contributions on possible aspects of a fissile material cut-off treaty and has participated actively in the meetings of the group.

Action 17: In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material

designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

16. Brazil has, alongside its partners from the New Agenda Coalition, submitted a working paper on nuclear disarmament verification (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.30) to the First Preparatory Committee to the 2015 Review Conference (2012), which deals, besides other matters, with the necessity to apply verifiable international safeguards to fissile material designated by nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for military purposes.

Action 18: All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

17. Brazil has never had facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Brazil expects that all nuclear-weapons States will urgently take the necessary measures to close or convert all facilities related to the production of weapons-useable nuclear material, which represents more than 85 per cent of all nuclear material around the world and is not subject to any international verification or oversight mechanisms, in terms of safeguards, safety and security.

Action 19: All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

Practical step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

18. Brazil considers that developing the necessary verification capabilities is an essential part of achieving complete and effective nuclear disarmament. Brazil has defended that multilateral organizations, notably IAEA, should play a central role in this respect. Brazil has taken the lead in support of the inclusion of the necessity of IAEA maintaining in-house disarmament verification capabilities in the Agency's Medium Term Strategy 2012-2017, as well as in the resolutions approved by the body's General Conference. Brazil welcomes the fact that, in resolution GC(58)/RES/14, the General Conference noted that the Agency must remain ready to assist, in accordance with its statute, with verification tasks under nuclear disarmament or arms control agreements that it may be requested to carry out by the States parties to such agreements.

Action 22: All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

19. Brazil has welcomed the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and

non-proliferation education. The Government of Brazil routinely informs the general public about important nuclear disarmament events and issues, both via traditional institutional channels (such as official press releases) and utilizing new information technologies, such as social networks.

Nuclear non-proliferation

Action 23: The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

20. Brazil supports the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has consistently called upon States that are not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon countries without any preconditions or reservations.

Action 24: The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the State parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.

21. Since 1994, safeguards have been applied on all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within Brazilian territory, pursuant to the Quadripartite Agreement. These safeguards have been applied by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA in all facilities in Brazil containing nuclear material.

Action 26: The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.

22. Brazil is concerned about the possibility of non-compliance within the Treaty, as well as instances of proliferation outside the Treaty. Ensuring full compliance with the Treaty by its States parties and seeking its universality are goals that must be pursued in parallel. Complacency with proliferation outside the Treaty runs counter to efforts aimed at strengthening its regime and achieving non-proliferation goals and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

23. To date, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been quite successful in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With one exception, none of the 185 States that have become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States has built or acquired a nuclear weapon or a nuclear explosive device.

24. Nevertheless, such success gives no grounds for complacency. Brazil is therefore fully supportive of multilateral efforts aimed at preserving and reinforcing compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty, notably through IAEA.

25. For Brazil, however, no matter how tight the verification of compliance may become the key to upholding the integrity of the Treaty lies in reducing the incentives to proliferate. In this regard, the continued reliance by some States or military alliances on nuclear weapons as the ultimate "deterrent" — and thereby essential instruments of a State's security — is probably the greatest threat to the integrity of the Treaty. Such reliance may be emulated by other States that feel threatened and that may conclude that the nuclear "deterrent" may be indeed essential for their survival.

Action 28: The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

Action 29: The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Action 30: The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

26. As noted by the 2010 Review Conference (Final Document, para. 17), it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol. For a non-nuclear-weapon State, article III.1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. No other safeguards obligations or voluntary measures, such as the Additional Protocol, can be inferred as a legal obligation under article III.1 and retrospectively demanded from non-nuclear-weapon States.

27. While States parties should continue to consider measures to promote the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements, as provided for under action 29, comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved, as stated under action 30.

28. Brazil regrets that nuclear-weapon States have taken insignificant, if any, steps towards the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in their territories under their voluntary offer agreements, as required under action 30. This state of affairs is in sharp contrast with the ever-increasing safeguards demands on non-nuclear-weapon States and reinforces the Treaty's structural asymmetries.

Action 32: The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

29. Brazil remains supportive of IAEA efforts to promote more efficient and effective safeguards, in strict accordance with the relevant legal instruments entered into by Member States with the Agency, and taking into account the necessary distinction between legal obligations and voluntary commitments, such as the Additional Protocol.

30. Brazil joined others in support of the IAEA General Conference request in 2012 for the secretariat to report on the development of new approaches for safeguards implementation through the so-called "State-level concept". Brazil also supported the General Conference decision in 2013 to request from the secretariat a supplementary document, produced after consultation with Member States and submitted for consideration and action by the IAEA Board of Governors.

31. In its 2014 resolution entitled "Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards", the General Conference welcomed, with Brazil's support, the clarifications and additional information provided by the secretariat in the supplementary document.

32. The General Conference welcomed in particular the important assurances contained in the document and in the statements made by the IAEA Director General and the secretariat as noted by the Board of Governors in its September 2014 session. Among those assurances, the following should be highlighted:

(a) The State-level concept will not entail additional rights or obligations under the relevant safeguards agreements;

(b) The State-level concept will be applied to all States with safeguards agreements;

(c) The State-level concept is not a substitute for an additional protocol; it is not designed as a means for the Agency to obtain from a State without an additional protocol in force the information and access provided for in that instrument; additional protocol measures will continue to be implemented only in States with an additional protocol in force;

(d) States will not be required to provide any additional information beyond their existing legal obligations.

33. The General Conference also noted a point which Brazil strongly endorses: that the development and implementation of State-level approaches requires close consultation and coordination with the State and/or regional authority, and agreement by the State concerned on practical arrangements for effective implementation of all safeguards measures identified for use in the field, if not already in place. Brazil believes this is essential to ensure that all parties are satisfied that any possible new measures fall within the scope of the relevant legal instruments in force between the State and the Agency.

34. The development of the supplementary document and the decisions by the General Conference on the State-level concept resulted from an unprecedented process of consultations and technical meetings between the secretariat and Member States. For Brazil, this process introduced a new and encouraging dynamic in how safeguards issues should be dealt with within IAEA. The discussions have given room for greater accountability and transparency on the part of the secretariat and for closer involvement of Member States in the development of proposed new policies. The openness and transparency that have characterized the exchanges between the secretariat and Member States should be continuing features of ongoing and future discussions on safeguards within the Agency.

Action 33: The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

35. Brazil fully supports the role of IAEA in guaranteeing compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and advocates the centrality of the Agency's work within the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. At the same time, while pursuing the Agency's safeguards activities in the most effective and efficient manner, an adequate balance in terms of resources must be preserved between all its

statutory activities, in particular with those related to the promotion of technical cooperation and other peaceful nuclear applications.

Action 34: The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.

36. Brazil has been contributing to the development of advanced safeguards technologies through the Brazilian programme of technical support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards, as a member of the so-called Member State Support Programmes. Brazil endorses this programme as a powerful tool for the development and improvement of nuclear verification technologies and methods and for capacity-building not only at the Agency but also in Member States. Currently, Brazil is supporting IAEA in the area of training, reference materials for destructive analysis, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) sampling techniques, novel non-destructive techniques for nuclear power reactors monitoring and the revision of guides on best practices for safeguards implementation.

Action 35: The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

Action 36: The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

Action 37: The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

37. Brazil has been an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group since 1996 and has incorporated the guidelines of the Group into its national legislation. Domestic norms impose procedures for Brazilian exports and re-exports of any related equipment, material or technologies identified under the list of nuclear equipment, material and technology or under the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment and Materials, Software and Related Technology, which may be applicable in nuclear activities. Those lists are updated periodically, with the aim of maintaining them in line with the Brazilian legislation and decisions adopted within the Group. Additionally, specific domestic legislation establishes procedures for the import of all nuclear-related sensitive equipment, material and technologies.

Action 38: The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

Action 39: States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties,

in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

38. Brazil is a founding member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 1957, it has participated in an active and constructive manner in the work of the Agency with the aim of strengthening the exercise of the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and promoting international cooperation in this field. Brazil receives significant benefits from international cooperation and also assists other States by providing technical cooperation on nuclear science and nuclear technology applications. Brazil maintains nearly 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, with both developed and developing countries. Brazil attaches particular relevance to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, in which it is an active participant, as both beneficiary and donor country.

39. Under the auspices of the Technical Cooperation Programme, Brazil sends some 50 technicians for training abroad every year. Furthermore, it offers more than 40 scholarships to nationals of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East and Asia for training at Brazilian institutions and facilities. Brazil also makes about 25 nuclear specialists available every year to serve in the context of IAEA expert missions abroad.

40. Since the 1980s, Brazil has been an active participant in the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly as a donor country, by making scholarships available at its nuclear institutions for the training of Latin American and Caribbean experts and by assigning Brazilian experts and instructors to assist other countries in the region. At the moment, there are 15 regional projects under the scope of the Regional Cooperative Agreement. Brazil also actively participated in the elaboration of the regional strategic profile for Latin America and the Caribbean 2016-2021, under the Regional Cooperative Agreement.

Action 40: The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

41. Steps to reinforce the physical protection of nuclear facilities in Brazil have been taken since the early 1980s. The National Commission for Nuclear Energy issued, in 1981, its regulation on nuclear security (CNEN Regulation NE 2.01: physical protection of operational units in the nuclear area), whose most recent revision was undertaken in 2011. The document is currently undergoing further revision in order to update its requirements according to the recommendations contained in the *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities* (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5).

42. Within the framework of IAEA, Brazil has been supporting several activities in the field of nuclear security, including the elaboration of the *Nuclear Security Series* documents, the sponsorship of regional courses in Latin America and the Caribbean, the organization of national workshops and the appointment of experts to missions. Brazil has actively participated in the joint task force of the Commission on Safety Standards, in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and in the Nuclear Security Advisory Service to discuss the synergies between nuclear safety and security. Moreover, Brazil took a leading position in the drafting exercise of the

ministerial declaration adopted at the 2013 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts.

Action 41: The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

43. The requirements of the IAEA *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities* (INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5) are being considered in the revision of CNEN Regulation NE 2.01 on physical protection of operational units in the nuclear area, which is presently under way.

Action 42: The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

44. Brazil is finalizing the necessary interministerial consultations with a view to submitting the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to legislative approval, as a further step to its participation in all relevant international conventions on the promotion of nuclear security and the suppression of terrorism.

45. In addition, the National Commission for Nuclear Energy is revising its regulations on nuclear and radiological security, taking into account international best practices and the provisions of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as the *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities* (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and other relevant IAEA recommendations.

Action 43: The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

46. Brazil has expressed its political commitment to the implementation of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

Action 44: The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

47. Brazil contributes to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal. At the regional level, it has been engaged in the efforts of the MERCOSUR and associated States to prevent, detect and respond to the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials,

including training courses for border officials, exchange of information and best practices.

48. In partnership with IAEA, the Brazilian Nuclear Physical Security Support Centre was established in 2012 with the aim of promoting the culture of nuclear security in the country, as well as training and qualifying personnel in the area of nuclear security. Six training courses at the national level and one at the regional level have been conducted since its creation.

Action 45: The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

49. Brazil has been a party to the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism since 2009.

50. The long-standing position of Brazil in this regard is that efforts towards nuclear security must be articulated within the international community's broader efforts to promote the goals of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, Brazil is convinced that nuclear security efforts must be geared towards protecting all nuclear material and installations, encompassing both civilian and military. This view drives the Brazilian position in discussions related to nuclear security, both at IAEA and in other forums. One example was the initiative, along with 14 other non-nuclear-weapon States, of the joint statement "In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security", issued at The Hague Nuclear Security Summit held in 2014.

Action 46: The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.

51. Brazil established its State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials in the early 1980's. The national rule on this subject was issued in 1982, the regulatory control body was established in the National Commission for Nuclear Energy and a laboratory was created for conducting independent measurements of nuclear material in support of the physical verification activities of the Commission. The Brazilian State System of Accounting supports the IAEA secretariat in the implementation of safeguards in Brazil by participating in IAEA inspections and providing support and logistic arrangements for equipment operation and storage. The latest relevant improvements in the Brazilian State System of Accounting were the development of an on-line real time accounting and control software (e-Gamma) and the upgrade of the safeguards laboratory of the National Commission for Nuclear Energy. The e-Gamma system, adopted in January 2014 for use in all nuclear facilities in Brazil, is also available for use by IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, allowing them access to the records of the Brazilian nuclear facilities directly from their headquarters. As for the safeguards laboratory, determination of uranium isotopic composition by mass spectrometer is under implementation, and future environmental analysis capabilities are foreseen. At the regional level, in 1991, Brazil established, in cooperation with Argentina, the Common System of

Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials was created to administer the Common System.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Action 47: Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

Action 48: Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Action 49: Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Action 50: Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

Action 51: Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

Action 52: Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.

Action 53: Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Action 54: Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.

Action 56: Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

52. Brazil is a staunch supporter of the inalienable right of all countries to conduct peaceful nuclear programmes. This right precedes the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is not restricted by it in any way. Brazil places great importance on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, from medicine, the production of radioisotopes, radiopharmaceuticals and radioactive sources, to the nuclear fuel cycle, power generation, industry, agriculture and environment.

53. Brazil is convinced that nuclear technology can play a very important role with respect to the post-2015 development agenda. As highlighted in the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, there is a need to achieve sustainable development in all its dimensions, integrating economic, social and environmental aspects and recognizing their interlinkages. The applications of nuclear energy have an impact on these three dimensions. Nuclear applications in health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and environment,

and energy contribute to eradicating poverty, saving lives, improving health and education and having gains in productivity.

54. As a country that is both recipient and donor, Brazil fully supports the constant strengthening and steady implementation of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, which should be provided with sufficient, adequate and predictable resources. Brazil is 1 of the 10 countries that offers the largest number of experts and lecturers for the Programme. It offers scholarships at Brazilian institutions and facilities, makes nuclear specialists available every year and sends technicians for training abroad (see para. 39 above).

55. Brazil has been an active participant since the 1980s in Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (see para. 40 above). There are currently 15 projects being carried out under the Regional Cooperative Agreement. The regional strategic profile 2016-2021 will enhance the formulation of future technical cooperation projects, in partnership with IAEA. It will also constitute an excellent foundation for the development and updating of the country profile frameworks of Member States in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

56. Brazil has also strengthened its cooperation in the nuclear field with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, in particular Angola and Mozambique, with a focus on areas such as licensing, medical applications and the management of technical cooperation projects.

Action 57: Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.

57. Information on nuclear facilities being planned, designed and constructed is regularly provided by the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission to the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and IAEA, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement and its subsidiary arrangements, in order to allow the discussion on safeguards features as early as possible.

58. In the field of nuclear safety, the Fukushima accident (March 2011) was undoubtedly the most significant event in recent years. At the Sixth Review Meeting of Contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was held from 24 March to 4 April 2014, the National Commission for Nuclear Energy Commission presented a national report that contained detailed information on the implementation of the national response plan to the fukushima accident. the national report outlined three focus areas within the response plan: (a) protection against risk events; (b) cooling capacity of reactors and pools; and (c) limitation of consequences. With regard to protection against risk events, studies on the reassessment of wave height, impact of tornados, flooding by internal events and fire hazard reassessment were concluded in 2014. In relation to the cooling capacity of reactors and pools, additional protection measures have kept priority status in line with the results obtained upon the conclusion of the stress tests conducted on the currently operating Brazilian nuclear power plants (Angra I and Angra II). With respect to the limitation of consequences, the installation of hydrogen catalytic

recombinators in Angra I has been concluded, whereas the installation of the same equipment in Angra II has already been procured.

59. Brazil has also been regularly receiving safety-related peer review missions, such as the follow-up Operational Safety Review Team mission in February 2014, the World Association of Nuclear Operators corporate peer review in October 2014 and the Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water Moderated Reactors peer review service in November 2014.

Action 59: Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.

60. Brazil is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Brazil is finalizing the necessary interministerial consultations with a view to submitting the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to legislative approval, as a further step to its participation in all relevant international conventions on the promotion of nuclear security and the suppression of terrorism.

Action 60: Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

61. The National Commission for Nuclear Energy regularly undertakes efforts with the national nuclear industry to strengthen nuclear security and safety culture, through the organization of workshops, seminars and training courses.

62. As regards nuclear safety, the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies has been instrumental in maintaining and improving radiological and nuclear safety regionally. Since 2013, the Forum has concluded the scientific tasks related to the criteria regarding the licensing and inspecting of ciclotrons used in medical research and applications. Likewise, it has issued the results of the project on nuclear and radiological emergency response. Finally, safety improvements identified by the resistance assessments conducted on the nuclear power plants of Forum member States are being implemented, so as to strengthen their operational safety.

63. In 2015, mock nuclear emergency exercises were conducted in the area of the Central Nuclear Almirante Álvaro Alberto, in the municipality of Angra dos Reis, by the Angra dos Reis Nuclear Emergency Response Planning Committee and in the area of Brazilian Nuclear Industries, in the municipality of Resende, by the Resende Nuclear Emergency Response Planning Committee. Several agencies took part in the exercises, including civil defence, health, environmental and nuclear authorities.

Action 61: Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.

64. Brazil has converted all of its nuclear research reactors for the use of low-enriched uranium fuel. All highly enriched nuclear fuel elements have been repatriated to the country of origin. The new Brazilian multipurpose reactor is being designed to use low-enriched uranium also.

Action 62: Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

65. The National Commission for Nuclear Energy has been working with the nuclear industry and other agents having access to radioactive material to improve security standards in the transport of nuclear and radioactive material across the national territory.

Action 63: Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

66. Brazil has been a party since 1993 to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Liability is one of the requirements set by the National Commission for Nuclear Energy for the licensing process of nuclear installations.

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Brazil

1. Brazil decided to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1998,[1] taking into consideration the easing of international tensions following the end of the cold war and the consolidation of the Treaty as the main international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, by virtue of the adoption of a strengthened, forward-looking review process at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. In doing so, Brazil sought to join other parties to the Treaty in focusing its efforts on the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals as the only means of correcting the built-in asymmetry between States parties and the full and definitive achievement of the Treaty's goals.

3. The National Congress of Brazil approved the country's accession to the Treaty on the understanding that effective measures would be taken with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as stated in the Legislative Decree[2] that approved the Treaty in 1998.

4. Underlying Brazil's positions on the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and corresponding national policies is the basic assumption that peaceful uses of nuclear energy are a force for development, to which all countries have an equal, inalienable and sovereign right, while the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a perennial threat over humankind that must be confronted with the utmost resolve by all countries and peoples. Nuclear weapons underpin an unjust and discriminatory international order that fosters instability and insecurity and also hinders social and economic development globally. The financial implications of maintaining (if not upgrading) nuclear arsenals sit ill with a financially constrained international environment. The vast resources spent yearly on nuclear arsenals could

[1] Act 2864 of 7 December 1998.
[2] Legislative Decree 65 of 2 July 1998.

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be better used for other purposes, including the achievement of the sustainable development goals worldwide.

Article I

5. Brazil considers that non-proliferation efforts are but a means of fulfilling the highest aspirations and purposes of the Treaty, which are aimed at eliminating the risk of nuclear war and achieving the goal of a safer, nuclear-weapon-free world.

6. More than 45 years after the Treaty was concluded, and 25 years after the end of the cold war, the continued existence of nuclear weapons, both within and outside the Treaty's regime, runs counter to its provisions and remains a powerful stimulus for proliferation. As long as some States possess such weapons, other States may be tempted to acquire or develop them, just as proliferation occurred prior to the existence of the Treaty, generating the nuclear-weapon States recognized under the Treaty.

7. Brazil is neither a member of any military alliance involving nuclear arsenals, nor is it protected by so-called nuclear umbrellas.

8. Nuclear proliferation is stimulated not only by the existence of nuclear weapons, but also by the ongoing qualitative development of such weapons and their delivery systems. It is also spurred by doctrines that seek to justify and perpetuate a purported usefulness and need for such weapons and that admit the possible use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing nuclear weapons.

9. A world in which nuclear weapons are allowed will remain intrinsically insecure, under the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear annihilation itself. This, along with the moral unacceptability of any weapons of mass destruction, should provide the strongest argument for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

10. Therefore, the five nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty are called upon to undo the effects of their original development, proliferation and accumulation of nuclear weapons by fulfilling their unique responsibility for achieving the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

11. Confidence that nuclear weapons are to be totally eliminated in the foreseeable future thus provides the most effective and credible bulwark against further proliferation. In this sense, it is urgent that the nuclear-weapon States make a clear commitment on a prospective time frame for the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

12. Non-proliferation concerns cannot hamper the inalienable right to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy or international cooperation related to peaceful nuclear activities. Non-proliferation concerns cannot be invoked as a pretext to impose additional obligations or new restrictions on States parties to the Treaty that have already forgone the nuclear-weapons option. Any new non-proliferation commitments, including in terms of enhanced verification procedures, must be considered in the light of the Treaty's overall implementation, particularly with regard to the nuclear-weapon States' nuclear disarmament obligations.

Article II

13. The Constitution of Brazil[3] expressly forbids all non-peaceful nuclear activities within the country's territory. Brazil does not possess, nor has it ever developed, nuclear weapons, and has always fulfilled its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Legislation in force (see below) prohibits and prevents the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear explosive device in its territory. Furthermore, Brazil abstains from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or from participating, in any way, in any of the said activities. Moreover, Brazil is not a party to any military alliance or security system that foresees the possible use of nuclear weapons.

14. Brazil is concerned at possible non-compliance within the Treaty, as well as instances of proliferation outside the Treaty. Ensuring full compliance with the Treaty by its States parties and seeking its universality are goals that must be pursued in parallel. Complacency with proliferation outside the Treaty runs counter to efforts aiming at strengthening its regime and achieving non-proliferation goals and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

15. Brazil shares the concern about the risk that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and related technologies may fall into the hands of unauthorized non-State actors or terrorists. Such a risk highlights not only the need to promote nuclear safety and security, but also, most importantly, to make steady progress towards completing nuclear disarmament and outlawing those weapons entirely. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is obviously no deterrent to terrorist threats. Only the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction can ensure that such weapons will never be obtained by unauthorized non-State actors or terrorists.

16. Besides the obligations derived from the Treaty and the incorporation into its national legislation of the guidelines adopted in the context of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Brazil has enacted legislation for the control of every nuclear activity in its territory, defining specific penalties for activities not authorized by the Government in this field. This legislation, set out below, is also in line with Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009):

(a) Act 4118 of 27 August 1962 created the National Commission for Nuclear Energy. It determines that all activities related to the nuclear field are a monopoly of the State. It establishes that the control of those activities is incumbent upon the National Commission. It defines as a crime against national security the clandestine export or import of nuclear materials (article 39). Furthermore, it prohibits the possession or transfer of nuclear materials, including by-products, without explicit authorization from the National Commission, even within the domestic market (article 40);

(b) Act 6453 of 17 October 1977 established civil responsibility for nuclear damages and criminal responsibility for acts related to nuclear activities. It defined and penalized the production, processing, supplying and use of nuclear material without necessary authorization or for other purposes than those allowed by law (article 20), as well as the export and import of nuclear material without due official

[3] Article XXI, paragraph XXIII (a): "All nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress".

license (article 25). If related to terrorist acts, the penalties associated with those offences are cumulative to those provided for crimes of terrorism;

(c) Act 1065 of 24 February 1994 approved the 1991 Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Argentine Republic, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials[4] and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards ("the Quadripartite Agreement"). The Quadripartite Agreement is a result of a historic, successful political process of integration and confidence-building between Brazil and Argentina. The two countries decided to follow an unprecedented path in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by creating the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and submitting all their nuclear facilities to IAEA and Brazilian-Argentine Agency comprehensive safeguards;

(d) Act 1246 of 16 September 1994 approved the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and resolutions 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990; 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991; and 290 (E-VII) of 26 August 1992, adopted at the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(e) Act 9112 of 10 October 1995 established controls on international exports of materials and services with possible application to weapons of mass destruction. It defines as sensitive goods all those with dual use in the nuclear, chemical and biological fields. The implementation of controls is supervised by an Interministerial Commission for Export Control of Sensitive Goods, established within the presidency of the Republic.

Article III

17. Brazil re-endorses the call by previous Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties, in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty, and welcomes the fact that 172 States have already brought into force those agreements with IAEA.

18. All nuclear material in Brazil is accounted for by the National Commission for Nuclear Energy, established in 1962. The National Commission regulates and supervises all nuclear activities in Brazil. It is also responsible for primary interaction with the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and for the implementation of the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA.

19. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency is responsible for the administration and application of the Common System of Accounting and Control to all nuclear materials in Brazil and Argentina, with a view to ensuring that no material is diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in conformity with the purposes of the bilateral Agreement that created the Agency.

[4] The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials was created by the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, signed in Guadalajara, Mexico, on 18 July 1991. The Agreement established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, implemented by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency.

20. The Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA subjects all nuclear materials in Brazil to IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The physical monitoring of nuclear activities, as mandated under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is conducted by both IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency under the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement. Such monitoring started before Brazil's accession to the Treaty in 1998.

21. All of the 25 nuclear facilities in Brazil are placed under international Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA comprehensive safeguards, including one uranium isotopic enrichment laboratory and one uranium enrichment pilot plant that are located at military facilities. A conversion plant, also located in military installations and presently under tests for determination of process parameters, is already subject to Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA safeguards. About 60 IAEA and Brazilian-Argentine Agency on-site inspections are conducted every year.

22. Cooperation between the international safeguards system (IAEA), the regional system (Brazilian-Argentine Agency) and the national system under the National Commission has contributed substantially to enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Brazil. Brazil has repeatedly stressed the need for increased integration of the implementation of safeguards at the international and regional levels. Brazil attaches great importance to the cooperation between the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA with a view to avoiding any duplication of effort and achieving cost-effectiveness in the application of safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.

23. The satisfactory implementation of the unique and comprehensive safeguards system in place in Brazil and Argentina is clearly recognized by IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency in their annual reports, without ever having given rise to any form of doubt with respect to the complete fulfilment of the commitments and obligations of the two countries in accordance with all relevant international instruments on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to which they are parties: the Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency (1991); the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967); the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968); and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996). Both agencies have independently concluded that all declared nuclear material remains as part of peaceful activities in Brazil.

24. That impeccable track record has prompted the Government of Brazil to state, in its national defence strategy,[5] that it will adhere to increased safeguards commitments that are additional to those prescribed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and geared to imposing new restrictions on States not possessing nuclear weapons, only after the nuclear-weapon States have advanced in the Treaty's main objective: their own nuclear disarmament. In that sense, Brazil welcomes the fact that the 2010 Review Conference has confirmed that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol with IAEA. Brazil remains supportive of efforts by IAEA to promote more efficient and effective safeguards, in strict accordance with the relevant legal instruments and taking into account the necessary distinction between legal obligations and voluntary commitments such as the additional protocol.

[5] Executive Decree 6703 of 18 December 2008.

25. Brazil has developed uranium enrichment technology indigenously and, like other States, is determined to continue the development of nuclear-fuel-related technologies and, in so doing, exercise its right to protect related proprietary and commercial information. Moreover, Brazil has a nuclear-propelled submarine project, the completion of which will require the application of special procedures on the nuclear material to be utilized therein, in accordance with article 13 of the Quadripartite Agreement.

Article IV

26. The inalienable right to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was not established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, since it pre-existed the Treaty. The Treaty has in fact excluded the possibility of any interpretation that would affect this right, recognized in article IV, which plays a pivotal role under the Treaty, together with the obligations contained in articles I, II and VI. Respect for this right and the undertaking by States parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes are key elements of the effectiveness and credibility of the Treaty regime. Therefore, any proposals aimed at limiting the exercise of this inalienable right should be firmly rejected.

27. The development and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle enshrined in the Constitution of Brazil. Nuclear technologies are an indispensable tool in modern economies and play an important role in global endeavours to reduce carbon emissions and combat climate change. International cooperation in the nuclear field is a key component of efforts aimed at sustainable economic development. IAEA plays an essential role in that respect.

28. Brazil is fully convinced that nuclear technology can play a very important role in the achievement of the post-2015 sustainable development goals. As highlighted in the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development,[6] sustainable development must be achieved in all its dimensions, with a view to integrating the economic, social and environmental aspects. Nuclear energy will certainly have an impact on those three areas, particularly when taking into account that nuclear applications in health, nutrition, food, agriculture, environment, industry and energy can contribute to the preservation of life, eradication of poverty, improvement of health and education and productivity gains.

29. Brazil is a founding member of IAEA. Since 1957, it has participated in an active and constructive manner in the work of the Agency with the aim of strengthening the exercise of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and promoting international cooperation in this field. Brazil receives significant benefits from international cooperation and also assists other States by providing technical cooperation on nuclear science and nuclear technology applications. Brazil maintains nearly 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, with both developed and developing countries. Brazil attaches particular relevance to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, in which it is an active participant, as both a beneficiary and a donor country.

[6] "The future we want", endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/288.

30. Under the auspices of the Programme, Brazil sends around 50 technicians abroad for training every year. Furthermore, it offers more than 40 scholarships for nationals of Latin American and Caribbean, African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries to receive training at Brazilian institutions and facilities. Brazil also makes available about two dozen nuclear specialists every year to serve in the context of IAEA expert missions abroad.

31. Since the 1980s, Brazil has been an active participant in the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL), mainly as a donor country, both by making available scholarships at its nuclear institutions for the training of Latin American and Caribbean experts and by making available Brazilian experts and instructors to assist other countries in the region.

32. Brazil operates two nuclear power plants, and a third one is under construction. Altogether, they will generate approximately 3,000 megawatts. Brazil is endowed with the world's sixth-largest uranium ore reserves, with 70 per cent of the territory still to be prospected, and has developed wide-ranging production capabilities, from the mining and processing of uranium to UO2 and isotopic uranium enrichment, all the way to nuclear fuel element production. Uranium enrichment activities were started in 1987 at the Aramar Experimental Centre, which developed the technology indigenously. The industrial enrichment facility and the fuel fabrication plant, located at Resende, are now fully operational and continue to increase their production capacity.

33. Besides electrical power generation, Brazil's nuclear activities extend to wide-ranging applications in medicine, agriculture, industry and environmental protection. More than 700 hospitals and clinics use nuclear techniques in medical applications, including radiotherapy and nuclear medicine. More than 450 clinical facilities apply radiopharmaceutical products in more than 2.5 million medical procedures every year. Furthermore, there are approximately 22 specialized laboratories that conduct radio-immune assays. Nearly 700 industrial plants use radioisotopes, for instance, in food irradiation, polymerization, industrial radiography and oil-well operations. Brazil is building a 30-megawatt multipurpose research reactor in cooperation with Argentina. The reactor's basic engineering design was concluded in 2014, and the site approval by the nuclear regulatory authority was issued in January 2015.

34. With regard to nuclear safety and nuclear security for the uses of nuclear energy, Brazil believes that IAEA should play the key role in the development of safety standards, nuclear security guidance and relevant conventions based on best practice. Brazil is finalizing the necessary interministerial consultations with a view to submitting the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to legislative approval, as a further step to its participation in all relevant international conventions on the promotion of nuclear security and the suppression of terrorism. The National Commission for Nuclear Energy is revising its regulations on nuclear and radiological security, taking into account international best practices and provisions of the Amendment, as well as *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities* (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and other relevant IAEA recommendations. Brazil has expressed its political commitment to the implementation of the IAEA Code of

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

35. In a more comprehensive approach to nuclear security, Brazil has a long-standing position that efforts in that field must be articulated within the international community's broader efforts to promote the goals of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As long as nuclear disarmament remains unrealized, measures aimed at securing nuclear materials and facilities will be tinged with an undeniable degree of precariousness. The additional risks stemming from the possibility of State or non-State actors having access to nuclear weapons or nuclear materials only heightens the need to expedite nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Brazil is convinced that nuclear security efforts must be geared towards protecting all nuclear material and installations, encompassing both civilian and military. Without detriment to the protection of sensitive national security information, nuclear-weapon States should regularly give an account of measures related to the security of their nuclear arsenals and their nuclear materials for military purposes. Finally, we should also be aware that concerns with nuclear security cannot be invoked to preclude the legitimate right of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

36. This broader view drives the position of Brazil in discussions related to nuclear security, both at IAEA and in other forums. One example was the initiative, along with 14 other non-nuclear-weapon States, of the joint statement "In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security", issued at The Hague Nuclear Security Summit held in 2014.

Article V

37. The Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences affirm that the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Brazil participated actively in negotiations on the Treaty, signed it on the day it was opened for signature — 24 September 1996 — and ratified it on 24 July 1998. Since then, Brazil has been actively participating in the work of the Vienna-based Preparatory Commission for the future Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

38. In line with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as with previous commitments made under the above-mentioned bilateral and quadripartite nuclear agreements signed with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and IAEA in 1991, Brazil revoked its reservations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco concerning peaceful nuclear explosions, thus relinquishing the right to conduct them.

39. Brazil has consistently called for the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and welcomes the fact that, so far, 183 States have signed and 164 have ratified the Treaty. However, it continues to call on States, particularly the eight States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have not yet done so, to ratify it as soon as possible. Brazil welcomes the current moratoriums on nuclear testing by States possessing nuclear weapons, but recalls that such moratoriums do not have legally binding effects and are no substitute for the Treaty's entry into force.

40. Brazil has repeatedly raised the issue that, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all countries should refrain from actions that may undermine its goals. We continue to learn with great concern of activities aimed at the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through other means, mainly non-explosive experiments. Such actions include the development of subcritical tests, which, in the view of many countries, including Brazil and other countries in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, are contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty, contradict its spirit, if not its letter, and strongly undermine its impact as a nuclear disarmament measure. Brazil therefore calls for the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all their forms, both supercritical and subcritical.

Article VI

41. As highlighted in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war, States parties need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war. The risk of a global nuclear war did not disappear with the end of the cold war. The risk of a nuclear attack, either by design or accident, persists, and may even have increased.

42. Full understanding of the continuing risks of a nuclear catastrophe has been advanced recently by the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Oslo; Nayarit, Mexico; and Vienna. They emphasized the unacceptability of the continued existence of nuclear weapons in the face of those weapons' indiscriminate nature, their long-ranging effects on human health and on the environment, and the impossibility, on the part of any country or organization, of providing adequate humanitarian relief in the event of a nuclear attack.

43. Forty-five years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and despite arsenal reductions, more than 16,000 nuclear weapons still exist, while security doctrines based on their use continue to play a pivotal role in the defence strategies of nuclear-weapon States. Brazil therefore identifies a clear compliance deficit on the part of the five nuclear-weapon States, which have not lived up to their commitment under article VI of the Treaty of pursuing negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament — which the International Court of Justice, in its landmark 1996 advisory opinion, recognized as an obligation. Nor do they seem to be willing to give any concreteness to their unequivocal undertaking in 2000 to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Brazil would like to stress that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 cannot in any way be interpreted as permission for the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons.

44. Although some worthy initiatives have been undertaken since the end of the cold war, including nuclear arsenal reductions and confidence-building measures, meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament — transparent, verifiable and irreversible — has been elusive. The results of the so-called step-by-step approach have fallen short of the initial expectations, highlighting the need for a reassessment of the international approach towards disarmament obligations. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, intended to be the first step, was finalized almost 20 years ago and is not yet in force, nor is it likely to enter into force in the near future. The beginning of negotiations on a fissile material treaty has been stalled for over a decade, making it hard to predict when it will be concluded, let alone when it will enter into force.

45. In order to fulfil the moral and legal obligations towards nuclear disarmament, both under international humanitarian law and under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is imperative to have a political horizon for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Brazil believes it is high time to challenge the notion that progress in nuclear disarmament should depend on the improvement of worldwide security and stability. In fact, the opposite is true. Brazil considers that only decisive action towards the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament commitments can bring about the conditions for a safer and more stable international order.

46. Brazil is convinced that nuclear weapons do not enhance, but rather diminish, the security of all States, including of those that believe they are more secure by virtue of possessing such weapons or of participating in nuclear-weapon-based military alliances. Reducing stockpiles will not lead to true nuclear disarmament as long as nuclear weapons are seen as strategic assets and qualitative arms races continue, although in less visible or disguised forms.

47. Brazil acknowledges the steps taken by the nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals. Increased transparency, however, should not be understood as an end in itself, but rather as a means to advance towards effective and complete nuclear disarmament.

48. The "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, adopted and reaffirmed at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be taken in all seriousness. Nuclear-weapon States are called upon to demonstrate an unflinching commitment to the speedy implementation of the agreed path towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Although unilateral and bilateral reductions are an indispensable part of the overall nuclear disarmament effort, they cannot substitute for a framework of multilaterally agreed measures.

49. Complete, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament must remain a global priority and this should be reflected in concrete, decisive steps towards it, with the urgent launching of negotiations on a comprehensive and legally binding instrument to ban the development, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, retention, testing, use and transfer of nuclear weapons and that provides for their complete elimination. Brazil believes that the negotiations must take place within the existing multilateral system, either at the Conference on Disarmament or, if this is not viable, by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

50. Brazil considers that developing the necessary verification capabilities is an essential part of achieving complete and effective nuclear disarmament. Brazil has defended that multilateral organizations, notably IAEA, should play a major role in that respect. Brazil has supported the inclusion of a reference on the necessity of IAEA maintaining in-house disarmament verification capabilities in the Agency's Medium Term Strategy 2012-2017, as well as in resolutions approved by the body's General Conference.

Article VII

51. Brazil is a founding member of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited region of the world, established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was adopted by all Latin American and Caribbean States. The Treaty, which predates the

Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, has been ratified by every country in the region and is considered a model for all other initiatives that have resulted in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

52. Brazil strongly supports the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and considers that they play an increasingly important role in efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world. In that spirit, Brazil participated in the three conferences of nuclear-weapon-free zones, held in 2005 in Mexico City, and in 2010 and 2015 in New York. Today, 113 countries belong to nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

53. The States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have been calling on the nuclear-weapon States to review the negative security assurances extended to them under the auspices of the Protocols to the Treaty. Unfortunately, the nuclear-weapon States' response is disappointing, inasmuch as they chose to retain their reservations to or unilateral interpretations of the Protocols. Brazil, both bilaterally and as a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, continues to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to review their position on this issue, with a view to providing the members of such zones with unequivocal assurances against the use of nuclear weapons.

54. Together with New Zealand, Brazil has since 1996 sponsored a resolution of the General Assembly entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", which recognizes that nuclear-weapon-free zones are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere of nuclear weapons. The resolution also affirms the contribution of this effort to the strengthening of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, as an example to the nuclear-weapon States and to those States that have joined them in nuclear-weapon-based military alliances. In this regard, the resolution calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and to work expeditiously for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

55. Brazil fully supports the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as per the 1995 Review Conference resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES/1). As a country unequivocally committed to the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the credibility of the review mechanism, Brazil is therefore frustrated with the failure, so far, to convene a conference on the establishment of such a zone in the region, as provided for by the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. Brazil believes that the successful convening of the conference represents an essential part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of the current review cycle. We believe the conference can be a useful tool in fostering greater trust and confidence among States of the region.

Article VIII

56. The strengthened review process agreed in 1995 ascribed a forward-looking role to the review conferences. Among other significant achievements of that process was the adoption in 2000 of the 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament and of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed and deepened those commitments.

57. The decision taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely does not signify that nuclear weapons are to be retained

indefinitely. Such a misconception would in fact encourage further nuclear proliferation and defeat the Treaty's goal of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Treaty must logically and ultimately be superseded by a comprehensive and legally binding instrument to ban the development, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, retention, testing, use and transfer of nuclear weapons and that provides for their complete elimination.

58. At the 2000 Review Conference, Brazil and its partners (Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) in the New Agenda Coalition worked closely on the elaboration and discussion of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts on nuclear disarmament, which came to be the most important achievement of that Conference.

59. After a difficult Review Conference in 2005, the 2010 Review Conference succeeded in reaching a consensual Final Document, whereby a new, enhanced action plan was approved. Lack of implementation of its main disarmament objectives, however, seems to undermine the confidence in the effectivity of the review process. While calling for the complete implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments of the 2010 action plan, Brazil believes that the 2015 Review Conference should not provide merely for a "rolling over" of those, but for the adoption of new, more ambitious and concrete actions related to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

60. Brazil considers that the challenges facing the implementation of the Treaty are of a political nature and not the result of deficiencies in the machinery or administration of the Treaty. The creation of new bureaucratic structures seems unnecessary and could duplicate work already done at the United Nations and IAEA. Although the strengthened review process could always be streamlined and made more efficient, it is sufficient for the purpose of ascertaining the full implementation of the Treaty. Political will by all parties is of the essence.

Article IX

61. The universalization of the Treaty remains an important challenge for the future of the Treaty. Brazil has repeatedly called on those States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it without delay as non-nuclear-weapon States parties. The establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, would greatly contribute to the integrity and sustainability of the Treaty regime.

62. Non-State parties should refrain from any action that might undermine the fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty, as well as of relevant United Nations resolutions. At the same time, unequivocal, concrete steps by the nuclear-weapon States to expedite nuclear disarmament and achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future would play a major part in encouraging nuclear-weapon-capable States outside the Treaty to reconsider their options and join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Article X

63. Brazil considers that the decision to withdraw from the Treaty — as from any treaty freely subscribed to — is a sovereign right recognized under international law. The indefinite extension of the Treaty adopted at the 1995 Review and

Extension Conference did not alter the procedure laid out in article X concerning withdrawal, in case a State party "decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country".

64. The rigorous procedure established under article X is recognition of the Treaty's relevance to international peace and security. Upon receiving any notice of a State's decision to withdraw from the Treaty, the Security Council should carefully assess the extraordinary events deemed to have jeopardized the supreme interests of the withdrawing country, with a view to, if possible, addressing that State's concerns and enabling the continued membership of that State to the Treaty.

65. It is Brazil's view, however, that discussions on withdrawal from the Treaty should focus less on constraints to be applied to those States parties that may potentially leave the regime, and more on the incentives for States parties to remain within it. That main incentive, in Brazil's view, would be the implementation of all of the Treaty's pillars, particularly the nuclear-weapon States' disarmament obligations.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People's Republic of China

Report submitted by China

1. As called for in the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty are working to implement action 5 to "further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence" and to submit national reports on their implementation of action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 Preparatory Committee based on a common framework, in accordance with action items 20 and 21. Action 21 states that "as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security." The framework for our national reports contains unified headings for reporting relevant information and covers all three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. We encourage all States parties to submit reports having similar templates, in accordance with action 20.

2. China is a nuclear-weapon State and the largest developing country in the world. China seeks a peaceful, stable and prosperous world and supports the international non-proliferation regime, which contributes to this goal. China attaches great importance to the Treaty as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime; it strictly abides by the Treaty's provisions and has been making unremitting efforts to promote the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty in order to achieve the three objectives of the Treaty, namely, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

3. In response to the requests of the 2000 and 2010 review conferences, the Government of China hereby submits the following report on its implementation of the Treaty:

Reporting on national measures relating to nuclear disarmament

4. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a nuclear-weapon State, China is firmly committed to an open, transparent and responsible nuclear policy; it

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faithfully implements its nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and advocates the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China is pleased to see that this position has been gaining growing acceptance from countries and the international community in recent years. China will continue to do its part to advance the global nuclear disarmament process and to achieve the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

National security policies, doctrines and activities concerning nuclear weapons

5. China has always advocated and promoted the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China had no choice but to develop nuclear weapons at a particular time in its history for the sole purpose of self-defence, self-protection and safeguarding its national security, and not for threatening other countries. It advocates responding to nuclear threats, breaking the nuclear monopoly, preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons. In 1964, on the day that China conducted its first nuclear test, the Government of China issued a statement proposing a summit of world leaders to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The Government has since reiterated and promoted the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China has also called for the negotiation and conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

6. China has always been committed to a nuclear strategy of self-defence. Its principle for nuclear weapons use, the scale of its nuclear arsenal and its policy on nuclear arms control are based on this commitment. China's nuclear weapons are for the sole purpose of defending against possible nuclear attack and never for threatening or targeting any other country. China has never provided a nuclear umbrella for any other country or deployed nuclear weapons in any other country. China has never taken part in any form of nuclear arms race. It never competes with other countries in terms of nuclear input, quantity or scale and always keeps its nuclear arsenal at the minimum level required for its national security.

7. China is the only nuclear-weapon State that has consistently maintained the pledge to not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. In 1964, on the day that China conducted its first nuclear test, the Government of China solemnly declared that at no time and under no circumstance would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. Over the past few decades, whether confronted with a nuclear threat or with nuclear blackmail, as was the case during the cold war, or when faced with the drastic changes occurring in the post-cold-war international security environment, China has never deviated from its pledge and will never do so in the future.

8. China has also actively worked for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons among nuclear-weapon States and formally presented a draft "Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the other four nuclear-weapon States in January 1994. China also actively seeks to enter into commitments with other nuclear-weapon States, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, on no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

9. The policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons can lower the threat of nuclear weapons, reduce the risk of a nuclear war and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is an important step towards complete and thorough nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. China's

consistent no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge is in itself a genuine act of nuclear disarmament.

10. China is the only nuclear-weapon State that has pledged unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Since 1964, when the first nuclear test was conducted, the Government of China has all along kept this commitment. In April 1995, the Government issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all the non-nuclear-weapon States and its commitment to offering them positive security assurances. In 2000, China and the other four nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement, reaffirming the security assurances made in Security Council resolution 984 (1995). At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the Government of China issued statements offering non-nuclear State security assurances to the two countries in December 1994 and February 1995, respectively.

11. China maintains that the international community should negotiate and conclude at an early date an international legal instrument to unconditionally provide negative security assurances to all the non-nuclear-weapon States and supports the efforts by the Conference on Disarmament to start substantive work in this regard as soon as possible.

12. China's self-defence-oriented nuclear strategy is deeply rooted in its military culture tradition of focusing on self-protection. The Chinese people highly value harmony and peace, and have a long tradition of seeing war only as a last resort. As a Chinese saying goes, "belligerence will bring a country to its destruction, no matter how powerful it is". Being cautious about going to war is an important part of Chinese military culture. Therefore, ever since the birth of nuclear weapons, the Government of China has stated clearly that atomic bombs cannot end a war, and has committed itself to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons strategy. China's position is to oppose and prevent nuclear wars and, more importantly, to not be the one to start a nuclear war. China does not want to see the humanitarian calamities that are caused by nuclear war. That is another important reason why China is committed to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy.

Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification

13. China exercises utmost restraint in the development of its nuclear weapons, which is consistent with its quest for their complete prohibition and thorough destruction, its no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy and its self-defence-oriented nuclear strategy. China's first-generation leaders, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, unequivocally stated that "our country may manufacture a small number of atomic bombs, but we do not plan to use them ... we have them only as defensive weapons". They instructed the relevant departments to be economical in their research and development and that there was no need to produce "too many" nuclear weapons, as such weapons were to be scrapped eventually, and that having too many of them would become a burden for the country. China has never taken part in any nuclear arms race in any form with any country in the past, nor will it do so in the future. China's nuclear arsenal is very limited in scale and is kept at the minimum level required for its national security, thus enabling China to make significant contributions to the international nuclear disarmament process. China has officially closed its nuclear weapon research and development base in

Qinghai. After environmental restoration, the entire site was handed over to the local government.

14. China maintains a moderate level of readiness in peace time. If China comes undernuclear threat, its nuclear forces will, upon orders from the Central Military Commission, go to a higher alert level and make preparations for a nuclear counter-attack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under nuclear attack, it will launch a resolute nuclear counter-attack against the enemy.

15. China's nuclear weapons are under the direct command of the Central Military Commission. China attaches great importance to ensuring the safety and effective control of its nuclear weapons and related facilities and has taken concrete measures in this regard. China's relevant institutions and combat troops strictly implement a nuclear safety control system, an accreditation system for nuclear-related personnel and an emergency response mechanism for nuclear-weapon-related accidents. China has adopted reliable technologies to strengthen the safety and physical protection of its nuclear weapons during storage, transportation and training, and has put in place special safety measures to avoid unauthorized and accidental launches, in order to ensure the absolute safety of these weapons. China has modernized its nuclear weapons solely to ensure the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal. No accident relating to the security and safety of nuclear weapons has ever occurred in China.

16. China actively supports international nuclear disarmament efforts and has made concrete efforts in this regard.

17. China maintains that all nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and publicly undertake not to seek to permanently possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual and balanced reduction. States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in reducing their nuclear arsenals drastically. When conditions are ripe, all nuclear-weapon States should join the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation process. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable and long-term plan of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

18. Over the years, China has voted in favour of important nuclear disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, such as those entitled "Nuclear disarmament", "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" and "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

19. China supports the start by the Conference on Disarmament of substantive work, in a comprehensive and balanced manner, on such important topics as nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

20. China supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and is actively preparing for its national implementation.

21. China supports the purposes and principles of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and was one of the first countries to sign the Treaty. China has strictly abided by its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests. China supports the early entry into force of the Treaty and all the international efforts made in this regard. China has participated in all the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty and actively supported relevant resolutions in the First Committee of the General Assembly. China has paid its assessed contributions to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization on time and in full.

22. China has taken an active part in all the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission and is steadily preparing for the national implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. China has established a national preparatory agency charged with the comprehensive implementation of the Treaty. China has undertaken construction work on eleven monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory, of which six seismic stations, three radionuclide stations, as well as a radionuclide laboratory and a nuclear test-ban national data centre in Beijing, have been completed. Construction work on one of the two infrasound stations is close to completion and the other one is under preparation. As called for under the agreement, the Beijing and Guangzhou radionuclide stations have entered the third phase of the International Noble Gas Experiment. The Beijing and Lanzhou radionuclide stations regularly send monitoring data on air particles to the Provisional Technical Secretariat. The Haila'er and Lanzhou primary seismic stations as well as the Beijing, Lanzhou and Guangzhou radionuclide stations are undergoing testing and evaluation prior to certification. In May 2014, in Beijing, the Government of China and the Provisional Technical Secretariat jointly organized a regional technical training program on operation and maintenance for managers of international monitoring system stations.

23. China has taken an active part in the negotiations of the on-site inspection operational manual and other guiding documents as well as activities organized or supported by the Provisional Technical Secretariat aimed at enhancing the implementation capabilities of signatory states and the monitoring capabilities of the international monitoring system. China has developed the mobile Argon-37 rapid measuring and detection system and the radio xenon sampling, purification and measurement system, which can be used to quickly detect gases from underground nuclear tests. China has provided these systems to the Provisional Technical Secretariat to help it gradually enhance its capacity for on-site inspection.

24. China vigorously supported the on-site inspection integrated field exercise in 2014, providing the above-mentioned systems and sending relevant technical experts to take part in the entire preparation and implementation process of this exercise. In April 2013, the Government of China and the Provisional Technical Secretariat co-organized equipment training courses for the mobile Argon-37 rapid measuring and detection system and the radio xenon sampling, purification and measurement system in Chengdu and Beijing, in which 10 experts from 9 countries participated. The training courses gave them better insight into the Chinese systems. In November 2013, the Government of China and the Provisional Technical Secretariat jointly organized the twenty-first on-site inspection workshop in Yangzhou, and the participants discussed in detail the preparations for field exercises. During the field exercises in November and December of 2014, the

systems provided by China won high acclaim from the participating officials and experts.

25. China supports the early negotiation and conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

26. The Government of China is of the view that concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty to completely ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and would be an important step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

27. China has always supported the negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty at an early date in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate venue for the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. China supports the Conference on Disarmament in coming to an agreement on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work so as to start substantive work on the negotiations, including on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

28. China has supported decisions made in past years by the Conference on Disarmament on the mandate, working mechanism and other issues relevant to the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. It has earnestly participated in all fissile material cut-off treaty-related activities within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and has been actively communicating and successfully completed tasks in this regard. When it held the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament, China organized informal discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty. China has also been an active player in coordination between the five nuclear weapon States and in the dialogue process with relevant countries.

29. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 67/53, China has recommended governmental expert to the United Nations group of governmental experts on the fissile material cut-off treaty, sent delegations to the four meetings of the Group and taken an active part in the discussion on issues related to a fissile material cut-off treaty. China welcomes the work report of the Group, reached through consultations, reiterating the authoritative status of the Conference on Disarmament, document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

30. China attaches importance to research on nuclear arms control verification technology and actively promotes the international arms control process. China has established verification mechanisms for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, pursuant to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. These mechanisms played an important role in monitoring the leakage of radioactive substances from Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and the nuclear tests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

31. On 11 March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, causing a huge leakage of radioactive substances. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization immediately launched a process to monitor the spread of radioactive substances around the globe. Upon its request, China's Beijing, Lanzhou and Guangzhou radionuclide monitoring stations and the Beijing radionuclide laboratory

provided a large amount of monitoring data on the leakage. These data greatly helped the secretariat to monitor the spread of radioactive substances in East Asia and Northeast Asia and also contributed to research on the spread of particles and gases in the atmosphere as well as the improvement of the atmospheric transfer model used in comprehensive test-ban verification.

32. On 12 February 2013, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its third nuclear test. The Preparatory Commission carried out monitoring of the nuclear test explosion. The Beijing and Lanzhou radionuclide monitoring stations provided atmospheric particles monitoring data to the Preparatory Commission for this purpose continuously, over an extended period of time.

33. In the conferences on confidence-building-measures among the five nuclear-weapon States, China exchanged views with the four other nuclear-weapon States on verification technologies needed in the process of nuclear warhead dismantlement and authentication and the storage and disposal of nuclear components and nuclear material, with emphasis on technology to authenticate nuclear warheads and components, information barrier technology, monitoring technology used in the dismantling process and chain-of-custody technology during storage and transportation.

34. China supports and actively promotes the negotiations on an effective, internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. China has conducted research on a reasonable, effective and cost-effective nuclear verification system that can address the concerns of all member States as well as on the system's relationship to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Transparency and confidence-building measures

35. China's nuclear strategy and nuclear policy have been consistent, open and transparent. China holds the view that nuclear transparency should be guided by the important principle of "undiminished security for all", fully taking into consideration the security environment faced by all countries and be implemented by countries on a voluntary basis in line with their national situations. With this as a premise, China has made many efforts and taken active measures related to nuclear transparency.

36. China published three arms control white papers, in 1995, 2003 and 2005, respectively, entitled "China: Arms Control and Disarmament", "China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures", and "China's Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation". From 1998 to 2010, it issued seven white papers on national defence. In all of these documents, China clearly explained its nuclear strategy, the role of nuclear weapons, its nuclear-weapon use policy, the development of its nuclear forces, the command and control of its nuclear forces and its nuclear-weapon alert status.

37. China has taken a series of confidence-building measures. China actively seeks to ensure that nuclear-weapon States do not target their nuclear weapons at each other. In September 1994, China and the Russian Federation issued a joint statement, declaring no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other and that they would not target their strategic nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, the Heads of State of China and the United States of America declared that they would not target the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control at each other.

In May 2000, the five nuclear-weapon States, namely, China, France, the Russia Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States, declared in a joint statement that their nuclear weapons would not be targeted at any State. In 2009, the Heads of State of China and the United States reaffirmed their commitment not to target their nuclear weapons at each other. In the same year, China and the Russian Federation signed the Agreement on the Notification of Launch of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles, which is now being implemented by the two sides.

38. To enhance mutual trust, the Ministry of Defence of China received visits by the then United States Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of House Armed Services Committee Ike Skelton, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to the headquarters of the Second Artillery Force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in October 2005, August 2007, January 2011 and July 2011, respectively. China also established direct hotlines between its Ministry of National Defence and its Russian and American counterparts in 2008. In addition, China and the United States have also maintained exchanges on nuclear policy within the framework of their bilateral strategic dialogue.

39. China actively participated in the six conferences of the five nuclear-weapon States, held since 2009 in London, Paris, Washington, Geneva, Beijing and London and has maintained dialogue and consultations with the other four nuclear-weapon States on confidence-building measures and the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of these conferences, the one in Beijing was successfully held on 14 and 15 April 2014. The five States discussed the enhancement of strategic mutual trust and coordination in implementing Treaty review outcomes and issued a joint statement at the end of the conference. China also hosted a public side event attended by delegates of the five States and representatives from academic institutions and media organizations to promote mutual understanding and trust.

40. China is leading the work of the working group of the five nuclear-weapon States on a glossary of key nuclear terms. It hosted three meetings of the working group's experts in Beijing in September 2012, September 2013 and September 2014 and made great efforts to promote the compilation of terms. Ultimately, in February 2015, the five nuclear-weapon States reached consensus on the glossary draft and agreed to submit the glossary in Chinese, English, French and Russian to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. China will also host activities related to the five nuclear-weapon States on the sidelines of the Review Conference and provide a briefing on the glossary issue.

41. These measures are conducive to increasing mutual understanding and trust, strengthening consensus and reducing misunderstanding among the five nuclear-weapon States and, as such, help to maintain regional and global security.

Other related issues

42. China is of the view that maintaining global strategic balance and stability will lay a solid foundation for the international nuclear disarmament process. Therefore, the Government of China believes that the practice of seeking an absolute strategic advantage should be abandoned and does not approve of the development and deployment of missile defence systems that disrupt global and regional strategic balance and stability.

43. China actively promotes the multilateral process of preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. In February 2008, China and the Russian Federation jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects (CD/1839), and called for discussions on the issue in the Conference. On 10 June 2014, China and the Russian Federation submitted a revised draft of the treaty to the Conference on Disarmament in an effort to push for the Conference to negotiate and conclude a relevant international legal instrument. China supports outer space transparency and confidence-building measures. As one of the sponsors of relevant General Assembly resolutions on the topic, China attended the 2012-2013 United Nations group of government experts meeting on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures and played an active part in drafting the report of the meeting. China has also participated in a constructive manner in the discussions on a code of conduct for outer space activities.

Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation

44. China firmly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form and has strictly fulfilled its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China has acceded to relevant international treaties and mechanisms concerning nuclear non-proliferation and has strictly implemented the non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council. China has established a comprehensive system of laws and regulations on nuclear export controls and has taken robust measures to ensure its effective implementation. China has all along treated the non-proliferation issue in a highly responsible manner and has played an active part in the political process to resolve regional nuclear disputes.

Safeguards

45. Upon joining IAEA in 1984, China undertook to fulfil the safeguards obligations under the IAEA Statute, and declared in 1985 that it would voluntarily subject parts of its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. In 1988, the Government of China signed the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China. In December 1998, China signed an additional protocol to strengthen the IAEA safeguards and completed the relevant national legal procedures for its entry into force in March 2002, becoming the first nuclear-weapon State to implement the additional protocol.

46. China vigorously supports and cooperates with IAEA measures related to safeguards. China has proposed 20 nuclear facilities for IAEA safeguards, including pressurized water reactors, heavy water reactors, research reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, uranium enrichment plants and nuclear fuel element production lines, among which six facilities have been proposed since 2010. China's efforts have not only broadened safeguards coverage in China, but have also helped to increase the Agency's safeguards-related technological capabilities.

47. In 2007, China joined the IAEA Member State Support Programmes, formally undertaking responsibility for research and development of safeguards verification means and methods. China has recommended experts to IAEA on a no-fee basis,

joined the IAEA network of nuclear material analysis laboratories and carried out validation activities.

48. China attaches great importance to the development of safeguards professionals. In late 2006, China and IAEA jointly established a training centre on nuclear safeguards and security, which organizes training activities on safeguards inspection, nuclear material inventory and control and nuclear export controls, thus enhancing technological capabilities and human resources reserves in relevant fields.

Export controls

49. China strictly controls and regulates its nuclear exports and has adopted three clear principles in this regard, namely, peaceful use only, acceptance of IAEA safeguards and no transfers to a third party without the prior consent of the Government of China.

50. In 1991, the Government of China announced that it would notify IAEA of China's export to or import from non-nuclear-weapon States of any nuclear material exceeding one effective kilogram. In July 1993, China formally undertook that it would notify IAEA, on a voluntary basis, of all its imports and exports of nuclear materials as well as its exports of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear material.

51. In May 1996, China undertook not to provide assistance, including nuclear exports, personnel exchanges and technical cooperation, to nuclear facilities of non-nuclear-weapon States that were not subject to IAEA safeguards.

52. In line with the principle of the rule of law, the Government of China has constantly worked to strengthen and improve the legal system for nuclear export controls and stepped up efforts to ensure the effective enforcement of its non-proliferation policies. Since the mid-1990s, China has gradually set up a comprehensive regulatory system for the control of exports of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, missiles and other sensitive items and technologies as well as all military products.

53. In 1987, the Government of China adopted the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials, which introduced a licensing system for nuclear materials and clearly designated the agencies in charge of nuclear material supervision and management along with their responsibilities; nuclear material control measures; application for, examination and issuance of nuclear material licenses; nuclear material accounting, inventory and physical protection; and related reward and punishment measures.

54. In September 1997, the Government of China adopted the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Exports, stipulating that no assistance should be provided to nuclear facilities that are not subject to IAEA safeguards; that nuclear exports should only be handled by bodies designated by the State Council; and that the Government would implement a nuclear export licensing system. The Regulations also provided for a more rigorous system for nuclear export clearance, severe penalties for violations and a comprehensive and detailed list of controlled items.

55. In June 1998, the Government of China adopted the Regulations on Export Controls on Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies, instituting strict

controls on the export of nuclear dual-use items and related technologies and a license management system for related exports. It also established an exporter registration system, procedures for export approval and penalties for violations.

56. Amendments to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China that were adopted in December 2001 stipulated that the unauthorized manufacture, buying and selling and transporting of radioactive substances are criminal offences and shall be punished as such. In February 2002, the Government of China adopted the Provisions on Safeguarding and Supervision of Nuclear Imports and Exports and Nuclear Cooperation with Foreign Countries.

57. China amended the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Exports in November 2006 and the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of the Export of Dual-Use Nuclear Items and Related Technologies in January 2007.

58. In April 2012, in order to strengthen the management of nuclear imports and exports, China enacted the Government Assurance Management Rules, and the China Atomic Energy Authority and the United States National Nuclear Security Administration jointly published technical guidance on nuclear export control lists. In 2013, the China Atomic Energy Authority published the Working Manual on Government Assurance Management. These measures have helped to increase the professional competence of personnel involved in nuclear import and export controls and to strengthen enforcement of nuclear export controls.

59. Regarding missiles, the Government of China adopted the Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies. Its control list in this domain is generally consistent with the annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines.

60. China's nuclear export control system has adopted internationally accepted practices, including an exporter registration system, end-user and end-use certification, a license management system, examination and approval principles having non-proliferation as their starting point, list-based control measures and the "catch-all" principle.

61. China joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in June 2004. China's control lists under the regulations on nuclear export controls and those on export controls of nuclear dual-use items and related technologies cover all the items and technologies listed on the control lists of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Nuclear security

62. China strictly fulfils its international nuclear security obligations. China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1989 and ratified an amendment to the Convention in 2008. It has improved its national nuclear security system to meet the requirements of the Convention. China participated in the drafting of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and completed its national process to ratify the Convention in August 2010. China strictly abides by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009), and takes concrete measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring sensitive nuclear materials. China actively supports and participates in international efforts to strengthen the management of radioactive

sources and supports the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

63. China is continuously improving its national nuclear security regulatory systems. The Rules on the Control of Nuclear Materials of the People's Republic of China was enacted in 1987 and the regulations for its implementation went into force on 25 September 1990. The China Atomic Energy Authority issued the Regulations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in International Transportation in 1994 and introduced the Regulations on Nuclear Power Plant Security in 1997. China issued seven guidelines in 2013, including on contents and requirements for nuclear materials license applications and nuclear facility entry and exit controls. In addition, China is now working on the formulation of rules on nuclear security. The sequential introduction of these regulations and guidelines has improved nuclear security regulation and supervision in China.

64. China has been increasing its input into and improving the management of its nuclear security. It recently carried out a comprehensive security analysis and examination of its domestic nuclear facilities and issued a plan for their upgrading. It has completed the translation into Chinese of the *IAEA Nuclear Series*, thus helping to increase its readership and application in China. China has also increased its input into the development of human resources for nuclear security. Through the above-mentioned efforts, China has made great strides in its nuclear security and its capabilities in this regard have significantly improved.

65. China has taken active steps to minimize the use of sensitive nuclear materials. It has phased out two miniature research reactors and is pushing forward with the conversion of another miniature research reactor into a low enriched uranium reactor. The experimental stage of the project went smoothly and a demonstration project will begin soon. Meanwhile, China attaches importance to international cooperation in this area and provides assistance within its capacity to those countries in need. During the fifty-eighth IAEA Plenary Meeting in 2014, China and Ghana, along with IAEA, signed an agreement on assistance in providing low enriched uranium for research reactors, formally launching a program for the conversion of Ghana's miniature research reactor into a low enriched uranium reactor.

66. China attaches great importance to research and development of new nuclear security technologies and is continuously improving its capabilities to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and to inspect and detect at ports and other points of entry. It has independently developed a range of new security products, including explosive detection systems and radioactivity identification systems. These systems have been successfully deployed to ensure the security of major international events, such as the Olympic Games in Beijing, the World Expo in Shanghai and the Asian Games in Guangzhou.

67. China has been an active player in the nuclear security summit process and has made contributions to consensus-building in the international community on nuclear security. Former President Hu Jintao led the Chinese delegations to the summits held in Washington in 2010 and in Seoul in 2012, where he expounded on China's enhanced efforts on nuclear security. In 2014, President Xi Jinping led a delegation to the summit held at The Hague, where he, for the first time, systematically explained China's approach to nuclear security. China is now taking an active part

in the preparations for the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in the United States in 2016.

68. China has taken active measures to implement the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summits and strengthened international cooperation related to nuclear security. It has been steadily advancing its domestic nuclear security regulatory system and carried out cooperation projects with countries such as the Russia Federation and Kazakhstan. China is establishing, in collaboration with the United States, a Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security, which, when completed, will provide systematic and comprehensive nuclear security training to countries in the Asia-Pacific region and make a positive contribution to the development of nuclear security in the region and around the world.

69. China actively supports and participates in a broad range of nuclear security cooperation arrangements at multiple levels. It has actively participated in various activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, of which it was a founding partner. In 2006, China joined the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database and shared information and resources with other countries. In 2007, China and IAEA signed the Practical Arrangement on Nuclear Security Cooperation, and the two sides cooperated in ensuring nuclear security at events such as the Olympic Games in Beijing. In 2010, China and IAEA signed the second Practical Arrangement on Nuclear Security Cooperation with a view to extending cooperation between the two sides into such areas as nuclear security regulations and standards, physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, capacity-building and training of personnel, and nuclear security culture. In 2013, China and IAEA signed the Practical Arrangements of Cooperation at China's Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security, making detailed plans for strengthening cooperation and the utilization of the newly built centre for nuclear security training. China has also worked with the United States to upgrade the security facilities of regional radioactive source storage centres and centralized the storage of several dozen highly dangerous radioactive sources. In January 2011, China and the United States signed the Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Jointly Establishing the Radiation Detection Training Centre of China Customs. In addition to meeting China's domestic training demand, the Centre also provides training services to other countries in the region.

70. China actively provides assistance to other developing countries on nuclear security. In recent years, China and IAEA have jointly hosted nuclear security training courses and seminars in China on an array topics. China has also provided as much assistance as possible to countries in its region through technical presentations and personnel training. China has been a consistent contributor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund for many years, with a view to promoting nuclear security capacity-building in countries in the Asia-Pacific region. China has also donated to IAEA nuclear security equipment that was independently developed by China. Within the IAEA framework, China has participated in the project to convert Ghana's miniature research reactor into a low enriched uranium reactor. China's Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security, set up jointly by China and the United States, had its foundation stone laid in 2013, with construction expected to be completed by 2015. The Centre will be equipped with world-class equipment and technology for nuclear material analysis, nuclear security equipment testing and emergency preparedness, and will become the largest, best-equipped and most technologically advanced centre for nuclear security exchange and training in the region and the world.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

71. China always respects and supports the efforts made by countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction, in light of the specific situations of their respective regions and on the basis of voluntary consultations and agreements.

72. China signed the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in New York on 6 May 2014, and is now actively promoting its domestic ratification. Previously, China had signed and ratified all of the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties that were open for signature, including Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Additional Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and Additional Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China has also acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

73. China supports the efforts of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, has resolved all pending issues with the relevant Protocol with ASEAN member countries and supports the early signing and entry into force of the Protocol.

74. China supports the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and hopes to see early achievement of this goal. China joined the consensus reached at previous sessions of the General Assembly on resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and supports the early convening of an international conference on this issue.

75. China respects Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and supports the relevant resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly. In 2000, China and the other four nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement undertaking to provide Mongolia with non-nuclear-weapon State security assurances. In 2012, they issued another joint statement reaffirming their support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and their security assurances to Mongolia.

Compliance and other related issues

76. China has strictly fulfilled its international non-proliferation obligations and responsibilities in relevant fields. It abides by the rules and resolutions on non-proliferation obligations adopted by international bodies such as IAEA and the Security Council.

77. China attaches importance to the role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It calls on all States that have yet to join the Treaty to do so as early as possible as non-nuclear-weapon States and supports the international community's efforts to refine measures to deal with withdrawal from the Treaty and to raise the bar for withdrawal.

Other contributions to non-proliferation

78. China has always addressed the non-proliferation issue in a highly responsible manner, actively participated in international cooperation on non-proliferation and worked vigorously to promote the settlement of regional nuclear disputes. China is of the view that the international community should pursue a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, reject the practice of opportunism and double standards, enhance the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and address nuclear proliferation concerns through political and diplomatic means within the existing framework of international law.

79. On the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, China is committed to the denuclearization of the Peninsula, maintaining the peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia and pursuing a peaceful solution to the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through dialogue and consultations. China has maintained close communication with the relevant parties and promoted, through various channels at and multiple levels, joint efforts by relevant parties towards an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

80. On the Iranian nuclear issue, China advocates both the safeguarding of the international non-proliferation regime and respecting Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy pursuant to the Treaty. In order to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, China has stayed committed to encouraging peace and negotiations and has actively participated in the diplomatic efforts to address this issue through dialogue and negotiations. At critical moments in the negotiations, Chinese president Xi Jinping and other State leaders reached out to their counterparts from the relevant States to build consensus. China put forward "China's approach" and "China's proposal" on a number of key issues to help bridge the differences between various parties. China also made a voluntary contribution of RMB 2.3 million to IAEA to carry out safeguard and verification activities in Iran under the Joint Plan of Action. Recently, through the joint efforts of the five plus one group and Iran, substantial progress has been made in negotiations at Lausanne, where all sides have agreed on the key parameters of a joint comprehensive plan of action, laying a solid foundation for the follow-up negotiations on drafting the plan of action. Going forward, China is ready to enhance communication and cooperation with all parties and to make unremitting efforts to bring about a mutually beneficial and win-win plan of action on the Iranian nuclear issue at an early date.

Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy

81. China supports the right of all countries, especially developing countries, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. China holds the view that non-proliferation cannot be used as an excuse to undermine that right. China attaches importance to enhancing technical research and industrial development for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and has accumulated abundant experience in that regard. On this basis, China has actively participated in and supported international cooperation efforts to promote the development of nuclear technology and the peaceful use of nuclear energy and has assumed its international obligations in that regard.

Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy

82. Over the past 50 years, China has created a nuclear industry from scratch, following a path of development that is commensurate with conditions prevailing in the country. A full-fledged nuclear industry system, including nuclear power generation, a nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear technology applications, has been put in place.

83. The Government of China considers the development of nuclear energy to be an important tool for meeting energy demands, ensuring energy security and tackling climate change and seeks to develop nuclear power in an efficient manner under the safety-first principle. In 2012, the Government adopted the modified Medium-to-Long-Term Development Plan for Nuclear Power (2011-2020), which set the targets of having 58 million kilowatts of installed nuclear power capacity in operation and 30 million kilowatts of installed capacity under construction by 2020. In August 2014, the Government drew up a new strategy for nuclear energy development, stressing the vigorous development of clean energy and deciding to commence the construction of a host of nuclear power projects in coastal areas.

84. In the field of nuclear power, to date, there are 22 nuclear power units in commercial operation in mainland China, with a total installed capacity of 20.1 million kilowatts, and 26 units under construction with an installed capacity of 28.45 million kilowatts. China leads the world in terms of the scale of nuclear power units under construction as well as in the speed of nuclear power development.

85. With regard to the nuclear fuel cycle, China adheres to a closed cycle in nuclear fuel development and has largely developed a full-scale nuclear fuel cycling system. The supply of nuclear fuel in China can satisfy the demand of all the nuclear power plants in operation. The fuel elements needed by domestic nuclear power plants are mostly produced in China. The pilot plant for reprocessing spent fuel, built independently by China, has passed the hot test, and China has signed a memorandum of understanding on long-term cooperation on reprocessing and recycling with France. After building two near-surface disposal sites for low-and mid-activity radioactive waste, China is in the process of choosing a site for the deep geological disposal of high activity radioactive waste.

86. While developing safe and efficient nuclear power, China is working vigorously on basic nuclear research, research and development of advanced nuclear energy technologies, increasing the percentage of equipment produced domestically, securing the supply of nuclear fuel, the treatment and disposal of radioactive waste and training of nuclear industry professionals.

87. China has accumulated abundant experience in nuclear energy development. It has set its eyes on cutting-edge technologies and independently developed a variety of nuclear reactors with advanced technical performance. China has developed, built and run a pebble-bed helium-cooled high-temperature reactor and started construction on a pilot project in Shidaowan in March 2011, for which the first tank of concrete was deposited on 9 December 2012. The experimental fast reactor has reached critical state and started feeding electricity to the grid in July 2011. On 18 December 2014, it achieved 72 hours of steady operation at full power for the first time. China's independently developed third-generation nuclear power reactor technology, "Hualong One", passed an IAEA reactor safety assessment in December

2014, and domestic demonstration projects have been set up at units Nos. 5 and 6 of the Fuqing nuclear power plant and units Nos. 3 and 4 of the Fangchenggang nuclear power plant.

88. China attaches importance to sharing experience with countries committed to developing nuclear energy under the premise of non-proliferation and has signed intergovernmental cooperation agreements with over 20 countries. It has also engaged in extensive exchanges and cooperation with those countries, including personnel exchanges, the importation of equipment and technology and trade, all of which have generated win-win results.

89. China attaches great importance to its cooperation with developing countries and has done what it can to provide assistance to countries new to nuclear power generation and to those countries interested in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Such cooperation is conducted under strict IAEA safeguards or as part of IAEA technical cooperation projects.

90. The Government of China actively supports multilateral cooperation and exchanges to promote nuclear technology development and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In March 1990, China joined the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia. In June 1992, it signed the Asia Nuclear Technology Cooperation Agreement. In November 2006, it signed the charter of the Generation IV International Forum. In August 2007, it ratified the Joint Implementation Agreement on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and, in the same year, joined the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. In March 2008, China acceded to the Framework Agreement for International Collaboration on Research and Development of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems. In October 2013, the China Atomic Energy Authority signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

91. In 2013, China successfully hosted the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, which is known as the Olympics of nuclear engineering, as its agenda covers almost all aspects of the topic. The 2013 Conference attracted over 1,300 engineers and technical personnel from more than 30 countries. Participants gave advice and made suggestions regarding the future development of the industry.

Technical assistance to other member States through the International Atomic Energy Agency

92. Under the framework of the IAEA Statute, China has supported and actively participated in the technical cooperation activities of the Agency. China makes annual contributions on time and in full to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. While receiving assistance from IAEA, China also provides manpower, material and financial support to IAEA technical cooperation activities.

93. By the end of 2014, China had contributed $34.98 million in voluntary funds, $2.46 million in project participation fees and $3.68 million in extrabudgetary funds to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. China also provided 1,964 person-time expert services to other member States, hosted 216 person-times from other countries for continuing education, 235 person-times for scientific visits and 2,043 person-times for seminars and meetings (solely meetings of the TC Program). In

2014, China donated a new irradiation system worth $2.5 million to IAEA for the upgrading and reconstruction of its nuclear technology laboratory.

94. In April 2009, in China, the Government and IAEA jointly held the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the Twenty-first Century, which boosted communication and cooperation in the international nuclear energy arena and contributed to the global development of nuclear energy.

95. In October 2011, China signed a practical arrangement with IAEA on cooperation in the field of safe nuclear plant construction, under which China's International Construction Training Centre on Nuclear Power, established by the China Nuclear Engineering Group, will undertake IAEA training activities in the field of nuclear power plant construction. So far, the centre has hosted six international training programs on nuclear power construction, in which 158 trainees from 33 countries participated.

Nuclear energy safety and liability in civilian nuclear energy use

96. China follows the principle of "putting safety and quality first" in its development of nuclear energy and takes strict and effective safety measures in this regard. It has established full-fledged and effective regulatory, supervisory and emergency response systems for nuclear safety and has been enhancing related infrastructure. To date, all of China's nuclear power units have maintained good safety records, with their performance on the chief indicators reaching world-class levels.

97. China has established a regulatory system for nuclear safety that is constantly improving. China has enacted and implemented a series of laws and regulations in this regard, including the Law of the People's Republic of China on Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Environmental Protection, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Monitoring and Management of Civil Nuclear Facility Safety, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Material Control and the Provisions on Design Safety of Nuclear Power Plants. Legislation on atomic energy and nuclear safety has been put onto the national legislative agenda.

98. The Government of China attaches great importance to nuclear safety. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, China took decisive measures to suspend construction of new nuclear power plants and conducted comprehensive safety examinations of its plants. On that basis, it adopted the Plan for Promoting Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control during the Twelfth Five-Year Period and 2020 Long-term Goals and the Nuclear Power Safety Plan and set out technical requirements to be observed as part of the general improvement of nuclear power plants that are either in operation or under construction. In June 2012, China issued the General Technical Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants Improvement Following the Fukushima Accident (Trial Version), which set out clear requirements for nuclear power plant safety and emergency response technologies. A series of improvements have been made accordingly to nuclear power plants in China. New nuclear power projects in China will be constructed in line with the highest global safety standards in the world and all new nuclear energy units will have to meet third-generation safety standards.

99. China attaches importance to maintaining daily preparedness for nuclear accidents. China has adopted a series of regulations and departmental rules, including the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Accident Emergency Response and Management in Nuclear Power Plants, the National Nuclear Emergency Plan and the Provisions on Conducting Nuclear Accident Emergency Response Exercises in Nuclear Power Plants and issued a revised edition of its National Nuclear Emergency Plan in June 2013.

100. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, China has worked to enhance its nuclear emergency response. Currently, China has established eight national-level specialized technical support centres and 25 national-level specialized rescue units for nuclear emergencies and plans to set up a 320-member national nuclear emergency rescue squad. China has strengthened the pertinence and practicality of all emergency drills and exercises and this year will conduct the "Shendun 2015" national-level nuclear accident joint emergency response exercise. China has also worked to spread scientific knowledge related to nuclear safety and emergency response and to continuously increase transparency of information of nuclear emergencies and safety. In 2013 and 2014, China successively conducted activities for the National Nuclear Emergency Publicity Week.

101. Nuclear power plant operators in China make every effort to release information on the safety of their operations. In order to publicize the information in a more open and transparent manner and to make the public feel safer, the operators have improved their ways and means of communication, including press conferences, information release platforms, social responsibility reports, white papers on safe development and open-house days. The operators have attached greater importance than before to raising public awareness of nuclear power and to establishing a full-fledged public education platform by utilizing new communication vehicles such as microblogs and WeChat (an online chat tool). They also give fuller consideration to local economic and social development in the areas where the nuclear power projects are located, so as to align nuclear power development with the development of the local community, thus creating a favourable social atmosphere for nuclear power development.

102. China has been making consistent efforts to establish a compensation regime for nuclear damage. In 1986, the State Council of China issued the Reply by the State Council on the Nuclear Liability of Third Parties, explicitly holding operators responsible for nuclear damage. In 2007, the State Council issued the Reply by the State Council on the Issue of Civil Liability for Damage due to Nuclear Accidents (known in short as State Correspondence No. 64), raising the compensation limit of the operator to 300 million yuan, and that of the State to 800 million yuan. The Tort Liability Law, which has been in place since 2010, stipulates tort liability in the event of a nuclear accident at civilian nuclear facilities. At present, China is studying the formulation of regulations on compensation for nuclear damage. These measures fully demonstrate the people-oriented governance approach employed by the Government of China, and its commitment to addressing liability for nuclear damage.

Other related issues

103. China attaches importance to the peaceful use of nuclear technology in other related areas. It has carried out wide-ranging research on the application of nuclear

technology in such areas as industrial detection of defects, industry engineering control, nuclear medicine and radioactive treatment, food and crops, livestock production and health, food irradiation, resources evaluation, archaeological dating and pollution monitoring.

104. China attaches importance to raising the level of scientific awareness of nuclear energy among the public. The Government of China and businesses have worked actively to publicize basic knowledge of nuclear safety, nuclear emergency policies, laws and regulations and of nuclear science and technology, which have increased public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy.